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Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that partner identification disclosure can improve
audit quality, because it may enhance transparency and individual accountability.
Building on a two-period matching model, we argue that the disclosure may distort
partner-client assignment–which affects audit quality and/or audit fees–because the
disclosure can inform the labor market for audit talent. In a centralized assignment in
which an audit firm assigns partners to clients, we find that with the disclosure, audit
firms may distort partner assignment–at the expense of lower audit quality–in order to
dampen partners’ career advancement. In a decentralized assignment in which part-
ners directly bid for clients, the disclosure gives rise to low-balling in the first-period,
because partners aggressively lower the audit fees to maximize their career advance-
ment. Our findings identify unintended consequences of audit partner identification
disclosure and provide economic reasons for the mixed empirical findings.
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1 Introduction
Audit engagement partner identification has been available in a few countries, such as
the UK, Sweden, China, and recently the U.S.1 Conventional wisdom suggests that disclos-
ing partner identification may enhance the transparency and accountability of engagement
partners. Transparency is improved, because the identification disclosure establishes the
link between the reputation of engagement partners and realized audit outcomes. With that
information, investors may learn and access the abilities of audit partners and thereby make
capital investment decisions efficiently. Accountability is improved because investors are
able to hold the engagement partner accountable for an audit. In the presence of investors’
assessments, audit partners are incentivized to build their reputations, thereby improving
the quality of audit services. These potential benefits are the fundamental grounds of audit
engagement partner identification.2
This line of arguments focuses on the effect of partner identification on the capital market
(investors). However, partner identification disclosure also informs the labor market for audit
talent about the engagement partners’ performance. The disclosure may in turn increase
competition among audit firms and make it harder to retain audit talent. In the presence of
this externality, audit firms and partners may strategically respond to the imposed regulation,
which may not guarantee the aforementioned benefits. In this paper, we study how partner
identification affects audit quality and audit fees by analyzing the behaviors of audit firms
and partners in the presence of the labor market. Specifically, our research question is, what
is the impact of audit partner identification on partner-client matching, audit quality, and
audit fees when the identification disclosure also informs the labor market for auditors?
To answer this question, we build a two-period partner-client assignment model consist-
ing of two risk-neutral partners and two risk-neutral clients. Following the audit practice,
we analyze two types of pairing between a client and a partner: (1) a centralized regime in
which the headquarters of an audit firm assigns two partners to two clients and (2) a decen-
1Effective January 31, 2017, a PCAOB registered public accounting firm must use Form AP to disclose
engagement partner identity to the public in the U.S.
2Audit tasks require a great deal of professional judgment and the expertise of engagement partners
(Causholli and Knechel 2012). As PCAOB (2015) points out, collecting information about the skills and
competencies of engagement partners could be useful for the users of financial statements.
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tralized regime in which two individual partners directly bid for two clients. There are two
types of clients (complex or simple) and two types of partners (high ability or low ability).
We assume that, whereas the client characteristics that determine the difficulty of the audit
task are observable, the partners’ abilities that determine an audit outcome are unknown to
everyone. The key assumption is that, whereas realized audit outcomes are observable, only
the audit firm and partners can correctly link audit outcomes to partners; without the iden-
tification disclosure, the labor market cannot distinguish each partner’s performance. We
further assume that audit partners do not shirk or misreport audit reports, due to ethical
considerations and reputation concerns. This assumption is made to highlight the idea that
although the disclosure may improve transparency and prevent auditors from shirking and
lying, the regulation may also result in partner-client assignment distortion and thus impair
audit quality.
Partner identification disclosure may enhance audit partners’ reputations and their po-
tential career opportunities. We define auditor reputation as the belief in an audit partner’s
ability. With the disclosure, the market can link the audit partner’s identity with audit
outcomes and thus attach its updated belief to individual partners correctly. As a higher
reputation implies a better audit performance, a partner with a higher reputation will have
more outside job opportunities and hence a higher reservation wage. While auditors switch
their employers just as lawyers and doctors switch,3 their potential job opportunities are
much broader. Unlike their counterparts in law or medical fields, auditors do not restrict
their careers to the same industry and may move to a consulting firm or serve as top execu-
tives in corporate sectors.4 Based on this feature of the labor market for auditors, we assume
that upon a successful audit for a complex client (a more challenging task), the partner may
receive an outside job offer that increases his reservation wage, if his identity is publicly dis-
closed. In the model, we call the increase in a partner’s reservation wage (due to his outside
job offer) career advancement. When a partner accepts an outside offer, a departing auditor
3According to LinkedIn Talent Solutions, the talent turnover rate in professional services (such as, law
and accounting firms) in 2017 was 11.4%, which is greater than that of healthcare and pharmaceutical,
9.4%. Moreover, the professional accountant turnover rate was 12.4% in 2017, according to the Inside Public
Accounting National Benchmarking Report.
4In 2017, Dentons, an international law firm, announced that Beth Wilson, a former partner at KPMG,
was appointed as the CEO of Dentons Canada LLP in 2017. Two years later, Dentons selected Andrea
Nicholls, a CPA and 13-year PwC veteran, as Dentons Canada’s CFO.
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may bring his engaged clients to the new audit firm he joins (Knechel, Mao, Qi, and Zhuang
2019), which causes the existing audit firm to lose both the audit talent and the audit fee
revenues in the future. Or, the audit firm may have to incur search costs to find another
auditor to replace the departing one. In this situation, retaining audit partners is crucial for
the audit firm, and partner identification disclosure makes the retention costlier because of
partners’ potential career advancement.
We first consider the centralized regime in which the headquarters assigns partners to
clients and bids audit fees on behalf of the partners. The headquarters bids audit fees that
cover at least the expected audit liability and the engagement partners’ wages. Because the
market (outsiders) cannot access individual partners’ performance without partner identi-
fication disclosure, the audit firm has monopsony power over partners’ perceived abilities
(i.e., reputation) and enjoys information rent (Waldman 1984; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).
In this case, we show that the audit firm assigns partners to clients efficiently in order to
minimize expected liability (thus maximize audit quality) in both periods.
By contrast, under the identification disclosure, the audit firm loses its monopsony
power over partners’ reputations and begins to be concerned about audit talent retention.
The disclosure makes partners’ career advancement more likely and induces the audit firm
to share the information rent with partners. When assigning clients to audit partners, the
audit firm considers the effects of the partner assignment on both the audit quality in the
current period and the partners’ career advancement in the subsequent period. When the
partner assignment is distorted, it may limit the partners’ career advancement opportunities,
thereby making the retention of talented auditors less costly. However, distorted (inefficient)
partner assignment gives rise to lower audit quality, resulting in higher audit liability and
audit fees.5 We show that with this economic trade-off, the audit firm may distort the
partner-client assignment when the partners’ career advancement is highly likely (thus, the
retention cost is significantly costly).6
We then consider the decentralized regime in which the partners directly bid for audit
5This finding is consistent with the credence attributes of an audit service (Causholli and Knechel 2012;
Causholli, Knechel, Lin, and Sappington 2013).
6In practice, partners may have different equity stakes and compensation schemes. However, our results
do not depend on partners’ various incentives schemes because of risk neutrality.
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engagements and then share audit fees and liabilities with each other. Given a sharing
contract, each individual partner bids audit fees to ensure his reservation wage. In contrast
to the audit firm, which intends to reduce the partners’ career advancement, the partners
aim to expand their career advancement. Without the disclosure, individual partners bid for
audit engagement in order to minimize expected audit liability (thus maximize audit quality).
But, with the disclosure, partners underbid audit fees aggressively, hoping to engage with a
complex client, which improves their opportunities for career advancement in the subsequent
period. Because of the reputation improvement, they will be able to charge higher fees in
the second period. Thus, under the decentralized regime, partner identification intensifies
competition between partners, which distorts audit fees.
More specifically, the decentralized assignment may give rise to low-balling in the first
period. When receiving partners’ bids, each client selects the partner based on the expected
net surplus from the audit. Holding the expected audit quality constant, the complex client
may select the partner who offers the underbid audit fee. As a result, the high reputation
partner has to reduce the audit fee (even below the audit firm’s break-even price) so that the
complex client will not take the low reputation partner’s underbid offer. While in equilibrium,
the high reputation partner audits the complex client and the low reputation partner audits
the simple client (i.e., there is no mismatch and audit quality is not impaired), the high
reputation partner must underbid (a lower audit fee) due to the low reputation partner’s
aggressive bidding for the complex client.
Despite the low-balling in the first period, the total audit fees over two periods with
partner identification disclosure are always higher than the total audit fees without disclosure.
To illustrate the intuition, the expected benefit from career advancement is greater for the
partner with the higher reputation, because he has a higher likelihood of audit success (and
a lower likelihood of audit failure). Both partners are willing to low-ball audit fees in the
first period up to their expected benefit from career advancement. On one hand, the partner
with the lower reputation wants to low-ball the audit fee for the complex client, but the
fee discount must be smaller than the expected career advancement opportunity, because
given his lower ability, he bears an incremental liability to audit the complex client. On
the other hand, the partner with the higher reputation offers a smaller fee discount to the
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complex client than the counterpart, because the client correctly anticipates that the former
will deliver a higher audit quality. We therefore obtain the following order: high reputation
partner’s fee discount < low reputation partner’s fee discount < low reputation partner’s
expected benefit from career advancement < high reputation partner’s expected benefit from
career advancement. Taken together, the fee discount in the first period is always smaller
than the expected increase in audit fee due to the partner’s career advancement opportunity
in period two. Thus, the net impact of the partner identification disclosure on the total audit
fees over two periods is always positive.
Our findings suggest that the rationale behind audit partner identification disclosure and
its intended benefits may backfire. Though the disclosure may help outsiders to learn an
individual partner’s ability better, the change in information environment can be useful not
only for client firms and investors but also for the potential employers of auditors.7 Thus,
exactly because of such learning by the public, an audit firm and/or individual partners
respond to the policy by distorting audit engagements or audit fees, thereby making the
information content in partner identification disclosure endogenous. Not only can this policy
limit the information content of disclosure, but it can also cause a lower audit quality, higher
audit fees, and inefficient competition among partners. These unintended consequences cast
doubts on the net benefits of engagement partner identification.
This paper is the first theoretical paper analyzing audit partner-client matching, to the
best of our knowledge. Our model builds on Waldman (1984) and Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998), which also posit that a current employer has superior information about its workers’
abilities relative to that of outsiders.8 However, these studies take information about the
workers’ abilities as exogenously given, regardless of the employer’s decision. With the as-
sumption that a task assignment and workers’ wages are publicly available, Waldman (1984)
shows that there may exist an inefficient task assignment, since the task assignment with
7In principle, there could be other ways to identify engagement partners’ identities even without disclosure,
particularly, in small markets. However, in large markets, as in the U.S., acquiring information about
engagement partners across different firms and across different years can be costly for individual users of
financial statements (PCAOB 2015).
8Apart from these papers, numerous studies in labor economics have relied on the assumption that a
current employer is better informed about an employee’s ability. See for instance, Greenwald (1986), Lazear
(1986), Milgrom and Oster (1987), Costa (1988), and Gibbons and Katz (1991), among others.
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wages can signal the ability of the workers to outsiders, thereby lowering the current em-
ployer’s monopsony power. There are two key differences between Waldman (1984) and
ours. First, in his model, the employer learns the ability of workers regardless of his task
assignment. In ours, the audit firm must learn the partners’ abilities through the assignment
(information about the partners’ abilities is not exogenously given); thus, any distortion
made by the audit firm hinders not only outsiders’ learning but also the audit firm’s learn-
ing. Second, in our model, the partners strategically react to the identification disclosure
policy, whereas in Waldman’s model, the workers have no strategic incentives. In the context
of job training provided by the employer, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) highlight the current
employer’s trade-off between monopsony power over the workers’ abilities and its incentive to
offer general training, which can be useful for other firms. However, the employer’s learning
about the workers’ abilities does not depend on the employer’s choice of training, whereas
in our model, the audit firm’s learning depends on its choice of assignment. Basically, de-
parting from these studies, we highlight the impact of the information environment (partner
identification disclosure) on the audit firm’s and partners’ strategic incentives.
To promote better policies, it is crucial to understand potential economic consequences
and analyze the net benefit to society. We identify a latent aspect of the disclosure policy
by highlighting potential distortions in partner-client engagement through the labor market
channel. Based on our plausible assumption that partner identification, by helping outsiders
to assess audit partners’ perceived abilities, may expand partners’ outside options, we derive
conditions under which unintended consequences take place due to this policy. In particular,
as the demand for audit talent increases (the probability of career advancement increases)
and/or as the remuneration for such an outside job offer increases, the distortion is more
likely. When individual partners bring and engage with clients on their own, some partners
(with high reputation) may have to reduce audit fees due to peer pressure from other partners’
aggressive bidding, hoping for career advancement. Whether it is the audit firm’s decision or
partners’ strategic behaviors, one obvious byproduct of partner identification is the increased
pay disparity among partners. Understanding these latent consequences in conjunction with
informational benefits will produce a cost-benefit efficient outcome, thereby helping us to
progress towards better audit regulations.
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Our paper contributes to the literature examining the effect of audit partner identifica-
tion on audit quality. There are two theory working papers analyzing this effect: Lee and
Levine (2016) and Basu and Shekhar (2019). Lee and Levine (2016) consider the trade-off
between individual partners’ incentives to provide high quality audits and the partnerships’
incentives to reduce good internal controls. Basu and Shekhar (2019) show that while higher
reputation incentives can improve audit quality, partners have a lower incentive to monitor
other partners under partner identification. In analyzing the impact of partner identification,
both studies highlight a team problem, whereas our study highlights the labor market for
audit talent.
Moreover, our finding in the decentralized regime identifies another source of low-balling
in audit fees (DeAngelo 1981). We show that low-balling in the first period for a complex
client can occur because partners can enjoy career advancement in the subsequent period
when their identities are disclosed rather than quasi-rents rising from transaction costs due
to auditor changes. Essentially, partner identification disclosure makes partners willing to
reduce the concurrent audit fees for their own benefit of expanding career advancement, as
the disclosure allows the labor market to learn partners’ abilities better.
A few empirical papers are related to ours. Using data from China, Gul, Wu, and Yang
(2013) find that individual auditors have significant effects on audit quality; Aobdia, Lin, and
Petacchi (2015) find correlations between a measurement of partner quality and the reliability
of earnings measurement. Using data from Sweden, Knechel, Vanstraelen, and Zerni (2015)
show that aggressive or conservative audit reporting is a systematic partner attribute and
that such differences can have economic consequences for a client. These results suggest that
disclosure of the engagement partner may provide useful information to the users of financial
statements. Using data from the UK, Carcello and Li (2013) show that the number of
qualified audit reports increased and abnormal accruals declined after partner identification
disclosure. Using U.S. audit partner data, Abbott, Boland, Buslepp, and McCarthy (2018)
document a reduction in the propensity to issue a going concern modification in the disclosure
regime, and Burke, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2018) find that the disclosure requirement has a
positive association with audit quality and audit fees and a negative association with audit
delay. However, Cunningham, Li, Stein, and Wright (2019) do not find consistent evidence
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of a change in audit quality or fees following mandatory partner identification. Our paper
provides a potential reason that there might not be consistent findings on audit quality
and fees following partner identification disclosure. Moreover, our results imply that it is
important to consider both partner-client matching and legal liability regimes for an empirical
identification.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the structure and ingredients of the
model. Section 3 and Section 4 establish the equilibrium under a centralized assignment and
a decentralized assignment, respectively. Section 5 provides empirical implications. Section
6 concludes. We present all the proofs in the Appendix.
2 Model
Our model builds on a two-period (repeated) assignment problem (Waldman 1984) with
the introduction of an audit production technology (Liu and Simunic 2005) and of partners’
unknown types.
Economy. We consider a two-period model where two audit partners provide an audit
service for two audit client companies in each period. The two partners belong to the same
audit firm (headquarters). For convenience, we refer to the headquarters as “she” and each
partner as “he.”All players are risk neutral and do not discount future cash flows. The
partners i ∈ {1, 2} are endowed with either high (h) or low (l) ability (type). The true
ability is unknown to all players, including the partners themselves. All players have an
identical prior belief about the partners’ ability: with a probability γi ∈ (0, 1), partner i is of
high ability for i ∈ {1, 2}. We call the probability γi the reputation of partner i. Without loss
of generality, we assume that partner 1 has a higher reputation than partner 2 (γ1 > γ2). Let
ω(γi) represent the reservation wage as an auditor for the audit partner with reputation γi.
The reservation wage is what a partner would receive in the labor market for audit talent.9
It is intuitive that the reservation wage increases with the reputation, ω(γ1) > ω(γ2). For
9In our paper, audit performance (and perceived audit talent) affects partners’ wages. Consistent with
this idea, Gipper, Hail, and Leuz (2018) find that low quality audits give rise to early engagement partner
rotations and have career consequences for partners (which affects their reservation wages).
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simplicity, we assume that ω(γi) = ω × γi, ω > 1. We posit that the amount that the
headquarters pays each partner is unobservable to outsiders.10 Consistent with the prior
literature (e.g., Simunic 1980; Magee and Tseng 1990; Bagnoli, Penno, and Watts 2001; Lu
and Sapra 2009; Chen, Jiang, and Zhang 2019), we assume the audit market is competitive
in the sense that the headquarters under the centralized regime (and partners under the
decentralized regime) breaks even in equilibrium.11
Clients. In each period, shareholders of the client companies are endowed with in-
vestment projects. We use the term “client” to represent shareholders of the company or
the company. At the beginning of each period, the clients decide whether to continue in-
vesting in, or to liquidate, the projects. The clients are differentiated by two dimensions:
the complexity of the audit engagement and the financial condition (i.e., type). First, the
complexity of the audit engagement is either simple (s) or complex (c) denoted by j ∈ {s, c}.
The complexity of the audit engagement is publicly observable. Second, depending on their
financial conditions, the client companies are either a good company (G) or a bad company
(B). With a probability p ∈ (0, 1), a client company is a good company and is worth V > 0
if shareholders liquidate it now, or is worth V ′ > V if the investment is continued until the
end of the period. In contrast, if a client company is a bad company, its value is worth I > 0
if shareholders liquidate it now, or is worth zero if the investment is continued. We assume
that the expected return from continuing investment is greater than that from immediate
liquidation of the company, that is, pV ′ > pV +(1−p)I, so that shareholders would continue
investing without knowing the type, but would liquidate the company if they know it is bad.
We assume the parameter space is such that the value of an audit from either partner is
strictly positive, so clients prefer receiving an audit service to none. We derive a condition
for this assumption in the Appendix. A client accepts an audit engagement offer only if
the audit service generates a per-period payoff higher than a reservation utility pV ′ that the
client would enjoy without audit service. Otherwise, a client rejects the audit engagement
10This assumption is consistent with the audit practice that audit partner compensation is not public. We
use this assumption to focus on the role of partner identification in revealing information about a partner’s
reputation. If the wage payment is observable, this can also provide information about partners.
11Simunic (1980) documents no evidence of Big N premium and does not reject the hypothesis that price
competition prevails throughout the market for audits of publicly held companies in the US.
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and the game ends.12 If a client receives multiple audit engagement offers (from the head-
quarters or two partners), the client accepts the audit engagement offer that generates the
maximum per-period payoff.
Audit technology. The audit technology is characterized by the probability that the
partners correctly attest to the client company’s real financial conditions. Denote r ∈ {g, b}
by the partner’s report where g represents a good report and b represents a bad report.
We assume there is no type I error. Given that the client’s type is good (G), the partner
correctly reports g regardless of the partner’s ability (h or l) and the complexity of the
audit engagement j ∈ {s, c}: Pr(g|G, i, j) = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Given that the client’s
financial condition is bad (B), the partner can correctly issue a bad report with probabilities
Pr(b|B, h, j) = 1− µ(h, j) if the partner’s ability is high and Pr(b|B, l, j) = 1− µ(l, j) if the
partner’s ability is low, where 1 > µ(l, j) > µ(h, j) > 0. Here, µ(h, j) and µ(l, j) represent
the probability of a type II error given the partner’s ability (h and l, respectively) for client
j. Since each partner’s type is unknown, when a partner with reputation γ audits client j,
then his expected probability of a type II error denoted as µ(γ, j) is given by:
µ(γ, j) ≡ γµ(h, j) + (1− γ)µ(l, j).
We define audit quality by 1−µ(γ, j). For notational convenience, we denote audit outcomes
by Xj ∈ {Sj, Fj, φ}, where Sj = (B, b) and Fj = (B, g) denote, respectively, audit success
and failure for client j ∈ {s, c}, which provides information about audit partners’ unknown
abilities. By contrast, φ = (G, g) does not generate any information, as both types of
partners can report r = g in case of G for both client j = s and j = c. Depending on the
realized audit outcomes, the two partners’ reputations are updated. We present the Bayesian
updating formula for a partner’s reputation in the Appendix.
Intuitively, audit failure is more likely, when the client characteristic is complex than it
is simple: µ(h, s) < µ(h, c) and µ(l, s) < µ(l, c). Without loss of generality, we assume that
the difference between a high-type partner and a low-type partner in audit failure is greater
12This setting is consistent with the auditing literature (Dye 1995, Liu and Simunic 2005).
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for a complex client than for a simple client: µ(l, s)−µ(h, s) < µ(l, c)−µ(h, c)13; that is, our
audit technology follows supermodularity. Thus, with the audit technology, it is efficient to
assign partner 1 (partner 2) to a complex (simple) client.14 As in Liu and Simunic (2005),
we consider a strict liability rule. When audit failure occurs and shareholders suffer from a
loss, the audit firm must pay a fixed payment L > 0 to the client companies.
Partner-Client Assignment. We consider two regimes: a centralized assignment and
a decentralized assignment. First, under the centralized assignment, the headquarters assigns
audit partners to clients and submits audit fee bids directly to the clients in period one and
two on behalf of the audit partners to maximize the audit firm’s payoff. In equilibrium, the
profit-maximizing headquarters pays each partner the minimum necessary payment, that is,
his reservation wage as an audit partner. Second, under the decentralized assignment, audit
partners have full autonomy in bidding and winning clients. In other words, the partners
will gain clients by bidding competitive audit fees. Each partner bids audit fees to maximize
his individual payoff. The partners within the audit firm will share audit fees and audit
liability following a profit sharing contract. Since the nature of the economic problems of
the headquarters and partners differs, we discuss details about assignment decisions and
audit fees in each assignment regime.
Key Assumptions. There are two main assumptions in our model. First, the head-
quarters knows the partner’s reputation by linking the audit outcome with the partner,
whereas the labor market cannot access that information unless the audit partner’s identity
is disclosed. In practice, the headquarters can learn an auditor’s reputation through gath-
ering information on this auditor as his career progresses from a junior auditor to a partner
within the firm. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the current employer is better in-
formed about the employee’s abilities than outsiders (Waldman 1984; Acemoglu and Pischke
1998). Second, we assume that if partner i obtains an audit success from a complex client
and outsiders know this, then partner i will receive a career advancement opportunity with
13We label client characteristics as either simple or complex for expositional convenience. As long as one
characteristic (in our model, a complex characteristic) separates high ability from low ability more efficiently
than the other characteristic (simple), then any labels can serve our purpose.
14Becker (1973) shows that when the matching production exhibits supermodularity, it is efficient to assign
the highest type to the highest type and the lowest type to the lowest type.
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probability u ∈ [0, 1]. For instance, reputable partners can be hired by an affiliated consult-
ing branch, by another audit firm, or by a corporate sector as a top executive, with better
compensation. Auditing a simple client will not gain the partner any such opportunities,
even if the audit is successful. We assume that the new job opportunity pays the partner
i compensation λ(γi), where λ(γi) > ω(γi) for any γi. For simplicity, let λ(γi) = λ × γi,
where λ > ω > 1. Hereafter, we call the incidence of λ(γi) the engaged partner’s career
advancement and the parameter λ represents the sensitivity of the career advancement to
partner reputation.
Other Assumptions. We posit that clients cannot communicate with outsiders (such
as other audit firms, consulting firms, or other companies) about their engaged partners’
identities. Moreover, if the reputable partner leaves the audit firm, the headquarters may lose
the engaged client (loss of fee revenue)15 or must incur search cost to replace the departing
partner. We do not distinguish between these two sources of costs for the headquarters.
Instead, we posit that our parameter values are such that the headquarters always wants to
retain partners to continue her audit business. We assume that a partner’s wage is agreed on
up front and paid at the end of each period. When the audit outcomes are realized, a partner
can negotiate the second period wage, but cannot renegotiate his wage in the past period. We
also assume that partners stay as long as they receive payoffs greater than or equal to their
reservation wages,16 and clients stay as long as 1) the previously engaged partner remains
at the audit firm and 2) they receive an expected per-period payoff greater than or equal
to the surplus they would have received without an audit, that is, pV ′.17 Lastly, we impose
a feasibility assumption that the headquarters (in the centralized regime) and partners (in
the decentralized regime) cannot bid audit fees lower than their break-even prices, and that
each partner’s wage must be greater than or equal to his reservation wage (which is based
on the market’s belief).
We start from our equilibrium analysis for a centralized assignment in Section 3. We
15As Knechel et al. (2019) show, the engaged client may follow the departing partner in case the partner
moves to another audit firm.
16We abstract away from a partner’s threat to quit (as a signaling device), as it would make the main
economic force less transparent without affecting the result qualitatively.
17 Since clients extract all the audit surplus in our model, imposing reservation utility greater than pV ′
does not qualitatively change our result.
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analyze audit engagement assignment, audit quality, and audit fee under the two partner
identification disclosure policies (either disclosure or non-disclosure) in the following section.
Based on the same structure, we then conduct our analysis for a decentralized assignment
in Section 4. We release the formal definition of an assignment equilibrium to the appendix,
as it involves additional notations that we do not use in the main analysis.18
Timeline. The sequence of events in each period is summarized as follows.
• The headquarters engages with one complex client and one simple client.
• Under the centralized assignment, the headquarters bids an audit fee for each client
and assigns one audit partner i to one client j. Under the decentralized assignment,
each auditor i ∈ {1, 2} bids an audit fee for each client j ∈ {s, c}.
• The auditors perform the audits and issue an audit report r ∈ {g, b} for each client.
• The values of the clients {G,B}, audit outcomes Xj, and payoffs are realized.
• Partner i’s γi is updated. With engagement audit partner identification disclosure,
each partner’s identity is revealed to the market. Under the non-disclosure regime,
each partner’s identity is not revealed.
3 The Centralized Assignment Problem
Assignment and Fees. Denote by at(i) : {1, 2} → {s, c} an invertible assignment
function in period t = 1, 2 that assigns partner i to client j. Denote by fHQt (i, j) the audit
fee in period t = 1, 2 bid by headquarters on behalf of its partner i for the client j to
maximize the audit firm’s expected payoff. To streamline the analysis, we assume the only
relevant resource cost is the wage payment to the partners. If the market can distinguish the
partners, then partner i’s reservation wage (i.e., his outside option) depends correctly on his
18The concept of our equilibrium is based on the notion of stability (Gale and Shapely, 1962). In the
centralized regime, we will solve for the headquarters’ optimal assignment problem given that such an
assignment is feasible. Whereas, under the decentralized regime, based on a partner-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm as in Gale and Shapely (1962), we will constructively find a stable matching between
partners and clients.
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reputation γi. If the market cannot distinguish the partners (i.e., non-disclosure), then the
market has to rely on the headquarters’ reputation γHQ = (γ1 + γ2)/2. Under the feasibility
assumption, the headquarters will not bid below her break-even audit fee; that is, the audit
fee must be greater than or equal to the expected liability plus any resource costs that the
headquarters must bear. Thus, when the headquarters assigns partner i to client j in period
t, the corresponding audit fee must satisfy:
fHQt (i, at(i)) ≥ L(1− p)µ(γi, at(i)) + ω(γi), (1)
where the right hand side represents the expected liability and wages, µ(γ, j) is the proba-
bility of a type II error, and at(i) = j is the assignment rule for partner i in period t. If the
market cannot distinguish the partners, ω(γi) is replaced with ω(γHQ).
When the headquarters makes bidding for clients, each client can correctly anticipate
the headquarters’ assignment, thus forming the expected payoff correctly. Specifically, antic-
ipating at(i) = j, client j accepts the headquarters’ audit fee f
HQ
2 (i, j) if the payoff from the
audit service is greater than or equal to its expected payoff without an audit (i.e., pV
′
).19
Client j’s expected payoff from receiving the audit service from partner i in period t is
pV
′
+ (1− p) [(1− µ(γi, j))I + µ(γi, j)L]− fHQt (i, j),
= pV
′
+ (1− p) [I − µ(γi, j)(I − L)]− fHQt (i, j). (2)
The client company j will receive V
′
with probability p when the company is good. With
probability (1 − p), the client is bad and the audit partner detects the true type with
probability 1 − µ(γi, j), and the client will discontinue investment and receive I; and with
probability µ(γi, j), the auditor fails to discover the true type and will pay liability L to the
client. The last item is the audit fee the client has to pay.
19While clients correctly conjecture which partner will audit them, they will not receive audit fees below
the headquarters’ break-even prices, due to the feasibility assumption.
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3.1 No Partner Identification Disclosure
We analyze the repeated assignment in two periods by backward induction. We first
analyze the headquarters’ partner assignment problem in period two. Taking into account
the period two game, we solve the headquarters’ partner assignment problem in period one.
Without partner identification, partners’ identities are not revealed, thereby blocking their
career advancement. In this case, there is no interaction between two periods, and the
potential career advancement of partners has no economic consequence for partner-client
assignment.
Period Two. At the beginning of period two, the reputation of each partner is updated.
Denote by γ
Xj
i the updated reputation of partner i upon an audit outcome Xj in period one
and by γˆHQ the updated reputation of the headquarters. Without partner identification,
the true identity of each partner remains unknown to the market in period two. Given
the conjectures on headquarters’ assignment in period one, the market correctly updates
the partners’ individual reputation γ1 and γ2. That is, the observable audit outcomes are
sufficient to correctly form the partners’ posterior reputation. However, without revealing
partners’ identities, the market cannot attach the updated reputation correctly to each part-
ner, and thus the market has to rely on the average of the two posterior reputations, γˆHQ.
Therefore, in period two, the headquarters compensates each partner by ω(γˆHQ).
The headquarters makes the assignment decision a2(i), i = 1, 2 to maximize her period
two payoff Π2 given as follows:
Π2 =
∑
i=1,2
fHQ2 (i, a2(i))−
(
L(1− p)µ(γXji , a2(i)) + ω(γˆHQ)
)
. (3)
On the right-hand side, the first term is audit fee revenue, the second term is expected
liability, and the third term is wages for partners. The reason that the second term is based
on the individual partners’ reputations is that the expected liability must be based on what
the headquarters actually knows (i.e., reputation of each partner), whereas the reservation
wage is based on the market perception.
The headquarters’ maximization problem is solved as follows. Since the partners’ wages
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are agreed on up-front, any associated cost that depends on the assignment in period two is
expected liability. Thus, the headquarters determines the optimal assignment rules a2(i) to
minimize the expected liability in this period. Finally, because we assume a competitive audit
market, the equilibrium audit fee is determined by the headquarters’ zero-profit condition:
the equilibrium audit fee equals the expected audit liability plus the partners’ wages so that
headquarters breaks even from the audit engagement. Due to supermodularity, the optimal
assignment rules are that the high reputation partner audits a complex client and the low
reputation partner audits a simple client.
Although we assume that partner 1 initially has a higher reputation than partner 2
(γ1 > γ2), whether partner 1’s reputation continues to be higher than partner 2’s in period
two depends on the three factors: the prior reputations, audit engagements in period one, and
the realized audit outcomes. Specifically, whether partner 1’s prior reputation is sufficiently
greater than that of partner 2; whether partner i audits a complex or simple client; and
whether the realized outcome is Sj, Fj, or φ. In characterizing the two partners’ ex post
reputation, it is useful to split the model parameters into two: the economic parameters
γi, i ∈ {1, 2} that evolve depending on the headquarters’ assignment, and the technology
parameters µ(γi, j), i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {c, s} that are independent of the headquarters’ decision.
Given the audit technology parameters, we characterize conditions with respect to economic
parameters under which partner 1’s updated reputation remains higher or becomes lower
than partner 2’s.
Intuitively, when the ex ante difference between the partners’ reputations is sufficiently
large, then regardless of the audit outcomes in period one, the updated posterior reputation
of partner 1 is still greater than the updated posterior reputation of partner 2. As a result,
the first-best partner assignment in period two is {a2(1) = c, a2(2) = s}. By contrast, if
the ex ante difference between the partners’ reputations is not large enough, the updated
posterior reputation of partner 1 might be lower than the updated posterior reputation of
partner 2; hence, the first-best assignments in period two could be {a2(1) = s, a2(2) = c}.
The following lemma summarizes the result.
Lemma 1. For any audit outcomes in period one, the updated posterior reputation of partner
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1 is greater than the updated posterior reputation of partner 2 if the ex ante difference be-
tween the partners’ reputations is sufficiently large (i.e., γ1−γ2 ≥M, where M ∈ (0, 1−γ2)).
Otherwise, the updated posterior reputation of partner 1 may be less than the updated poste-
rior reputation of partner 2 (i.e., when γ1 − γ2 < M). The expression of M is presented in
the Appendix.
Because there is no economic tension left, the partner-client assignment is not distorted
in period two, regardless of partner identification. Thus, in what follows, we pin down the
first-best assignment as {a2(1) = c, a2(2) = s} in period two by assuming that γ1− γ2 ≥M .
This way, we focus on the trade-off between current period audit production efficiency (i.e.,
period one audit quality) and the partners’ outside options (i.e., future career advancement)
instead of audit quality in period two.20
Assumption 1. γ1 − γ2 ≥M .
Period One. When making an assignment decision in period one, the headquarters
must take into account the potential consequences of her period two payoff. However, we will
show in the proof of Lemma 2 that the headquarters’ expected liability payments and wages
in period two are independent of her assignment decision in period one without partner
identification. The intuition is because partners’ expected posterior reputations are the
same as the current prior reputation and there is no career advancement without partner
identification. Therefore, in period one, the headquarters assigns partners to clients to
maximize Π1 given by
Π1 =
∑
i=1,2
fHQ1 (i, a1(i))−
(
L(1− p)µ(γi, a1(i)) + ω(γHQ)
)
.
As in period two, the headquarters determines the optimal assignment rules a1(i) to minimize
the expected liability. That is, in period one, the optimal assignment rule is such that a high
reputation partner (partner 1) audits a complex client and a low reputation partner (partner
2) audits a simple client, a1(1) = c, a1(2) = s. The following lemma summarizes the result.
20In case γ1 − γ2 < M , the headquarters must consider different assignments in period two depending on
audit outcomes in period one. This case neither adds any economic insight nor changes the economic tension
qualitatively.
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Lemma 2. (No Partner Identification) The headquarters’ assignment problems over two
periods are simply a twofold repetition of the partner-client assignment problem: the head-
quarters assigns a high reputation partner to a complex client and a low reputation partner
to a simple client in each period. The presence of career advancement is irrelevant when
there is no partner identification.
3.2 Partner Identification and Career Advancement
Economic Trade-off. In this section, we will demonstrate that the headquarters may
distort partner-client assignment in period one. The headquarters faces an economic trade-off
between the efficiency of partner-client assignment and the cost of talent retention. On one
hand, when partner assignment is distorted, audit failure is more likely to occur, thereby in-
creasing the expected audit liability. On the other hand, assignment may affect the market’s
posterior belief about the partners’ reputation, influencing their outside career advancement
opportunities. It is intuitive that this trade-off depends on the magnitude of audit liability
and the partners’ potential career advancement. We will show that when audit liability is
relatively small or when career advancement for partners is likely, partner identification may
induce the headquarters to distort partner assignment in period one.
Partner Assignment in Period Two. Given that two partners stay in period two,
the headquarters’ assignment decision in period two faces the same trade-off as in the non-
disclosure regime. That is, the headquarters assigns partners in period two in order to
minimize the expected liability. Since we assume that γ1 − γ2 ≥ M , the headquarters’
assignment in period two is a2(1) = c and a2(2) = s. While the headquarters makes the
same assignment decision regardless of the disclosure policy in period two, the headquarters’
total expected wage payments in period two under partner identification disclosure are always
greater than the total expected wage payments under the non-disclosure. This is because
under the disclosure, the partner who was engaged with a complex client in the first period
may enjoy career advancement at the beginning of the second period (due to his successful
audit in the previous period). The byproduct of such career advancement is an increase in
the pay disparity between the partners.
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Indeed, the possibility of an outside option creates convexity in partners’ expected period
two wages because λ(γ) has a higher slope than ω(γ). Thus, from an ex ante perspective,
the headquarters’ total expected wages in period two are strictly higher when the identity
of each partner is correctly known to the market than when it is unknown.
Lemma 3. When considered at the beginning of period one, the total expected wage payments
in period two under partner identification disclosure are always greater than or equal to the
total expected wage payments under non-disclosure. The partner identification disclosure
increases the pay disparity between partners.
Partner Assignment in Period One. While the headquarters wants to minimize the
expected liability, the partner identification disclosure may influence how much the head-
quarters pays the partners in period two, which affects her assignment decision in period one.
To formalize the headquarters’ cost of audit talent retention, let qi(u) denote the probability
of partner i receiving an outside offer at the beginning of period two if the partner audits a
complex client in period one:
qi(u) ≡ (1− p)× (1− µ(γi, c))× u,
where p ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that a client company is a good company and u ∈ [0, 1] is
the probability that partner i receives an outside job offer. We assume that the headquarters
cannot affect the probability u, which may represent the career mobility of partners moving
from one audit firm to another or to a corporate sector. As long as u > 0, the probability of
partner i receiving an outside offer is strictly positive (qi(u) > 0). The expected period two
reservation wage for partner i when working for a complex client in period one is:
qi(u)×
[
λ(γSci )− ω(γSci )
]
+ E[ω(γXci )],
where γSci is the updated reputation after having successfully audited the complex client,
and λ(γSci ) and ω(γ
Sc
i ), respectively, denote the reservation wage of the partner whether
he receives an outside offer or not. Since the expected posterior reputation is the current
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prior reputation, we have E[ω(γXci )] = ω(γi).
21 Thus, the headquarters’ expected talent
retention cost (due to partner identification) is qi(u) ×
(
λ(γSci ) − ω(γSci )
)
. We denote this
cost by T (u, i). Clearly, the headquarters’ talent retention cost depends on the probability
of a partner receiving an outside offer u, the potential outside offer λ, the audit technology
µ(i, j), and a partner’s reputation. For instance, when u = 0, T (0, i) = 0. In Proposition 1,
we analyze the headquarters’ expected talent retention cost.
Proposition 1. (Talent Retention Cost) Let T (u, i) denote the expected talent retention
cost under partner identification disclosure for partner i. For u ∈ (0, 1], the expected talent
retention cost is always greater for partner 1 than for partner 2: T (u, 1) > T (u, 2). Moreover,
the expected talent retention cost increases as
• the probability of career advancement increases (∂T (u,i)
∂u
> 0); or
• the career advancement is more sensitive to a partner’s reputation (∂T (u,i)
∂λ
> 0); or
• a high-type partner’s type II error for a complex client decreases (∂T (u,i)
∂µ(h,c)
< 0); or
• the reputation of partner i increases (∂T (u,i)
∂γi
> 0).
Proposition 1 shows how the headquarters’ talent retention cost changes with respect
to other parameters. Intuitively, the expected retention cost increases as the probability of
turnover increases or the career advancement is high-powered. Moreover, as a high type
partner’s ability to detect financially bad conditions for a complex client increases (i.e.,
decrease in µ(h, c)), the probability of career advancement is also high, which increases the
retention cost. The retention cost increases with the partner’s initial reputation, as his
reputation represents the probability that the partner is indeed a high type.
In Proposition 2, we identify the conditions with respect to audit liability L and the
value of the liquidation of a bad company I such that 1) the headquarters strictly prefers
the distorted assignment in period one, and 2) the headquarters’ distorted partner-client
assignment in period one is accepted by the clients. While our variable of interest is L
because it drives the headquarters’ incentive to distort the assignment, the liquidation value
21We show this in the proof of Lemma 2.
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I matters, as it determines whether such a distorted assignment is accepted by the clients
(i.e., the value of the audit).22
Proposition 2. (Partner Identification) There exist thresholds of audit liability LHQ and
the liquidation value I ∈ R+ such that
• if L ≥ LHQ or I < I, then, there is no distortion in audit engagement; or
• if L < LHQ and I ≥ I, then, the headquarters implements the assignment rule by which
the high reputation partner 1 audits a simple client and the low reputation partner 2
audits a complex client (a1(1) = s and a1(2) = c) in period one.
Under the distorted assignment in period one, the aggregate audit quality decreases and
audit fees increase. The expressions of LHQ and I are presented in the Appendix.
When the partner assignment is distorted, the audit quality for the complex (simple)
client decreases (increases) and the audit fee for the complex (simple) client increases (de-
creases). Although the audit fee for the simple client decreases (due to the decrease in
expected liability), the audit fee for the complex client increases more than the audit fee re-
duction for the simple client, thereby leading to the increase in the total audit fees in period
one. It is worth discussing that when u = 0, there is no distortion, regardless of disclosure
policies. Intuitively, when there is no career advancement, the talent retention cost is zero
(the same as the non-disclosure regime). Thus, without the labor market channel, partner
identification is of no economic consequence for partner-client assignment.23
For u > 0, the headquarters’ trade-off depends on several economic forces. First, if the
partner is more likely to receive an outside offer, then the expected retention cost is higher and
hence the headquarters is more willing to distort the assignment (∂LHQ/∂u > 0). When the
career advancement is more promising, the headquarters’ expected retention cost is greater,
22In this centralized assignment, the clients either accept the headquarters’ offer or reject (and continue
the investment without receiving the audit). Thus, as I is greater, the value of receiving the audit is greater,
thereby making the clients more likely to accept the distorted offer instead of rejecting it.
23The formal analysis is available upon request.
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thereby making the marginal benefit of a distorted assignment larger (∂LHQ/∂λ > 0).24
Neither u or λ affects the value of the audit directly; thus, the client’s acceptance decision
does not change.
Second, contrary to u and λ, the impact of µ(h, c) on the headquarters’ assignment
decision is ambiguous: it increases both LHQ and I. When a high type partner’s type II
error increases, then the incremental audit liability due to distortion decreases: neither a high
type nor a low type is good enough at detecting a financially bad company. Even though the
retention cost decreases in µ(h, c), the change in the incremental liability always dominates
the change in the retention cost (∂LHQ/∂µ(h, c) > 0). However, as µ(h, c) increases, the value
of the audit decreases; thus, the complex client is likely to reject the distorted engagement
(∂I/∂µ(h, c) > 0). Third, although the client’s acceptance decision is affected by γi, the
headquarters’ incentive to distort is independent of the absolute value of γi. This is because,
in our model, the headquarters’ talent retention cost and incremental liability are both linear
with the partners’ reputation. The following proposition summarizes our discussion.
Proposition 3. Suppose L < LHQ and I ≥ I so that the headquarters distorts partner-client
assignment in equilibrium under partner identification. The headquarters is more likely to
distort partner assignment in period one when
• the probability of career advancement increases (∂LHQ/∂u > 0, ∂I/∂u = 0); or
• the career advancement is more sensitive to a partner’s reputation (∂LHQ/∂λ > 0, ∂I/∂λ =
0).
However, the impact of a high type partner’s type II error for the complex client on the
headquarters’ assignment decision is ambiguous because both LHQ and I increase in µ(h, c).
Any change in partner i’s reputation does not affect LHQ, whereas the impact on I depends
on parameter values.
24Clients may threaten to leave the headquarters for the potential distorted assignment. If audit firms
are homogeneous (thus, facing the same economic trade-off) or clients must incur sufficiently high switching
costs to change audit firms, then the clients’ threat will be less credible. If audit firms are heterogeneous
(e.g., competition between big 4 and non-big 4) and the switching cost is negligible, then the client’s threat
can be credible. Introducing additional costs from a client’s threat would constitute a digression from the
economic force from the labor market for auditors. Nevertheless, incorporating audit firm heterogeneity
presents an interesting avenue for future research.
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4 The Decentralized Assignment Problem
In practice, partners often directly bid for clients rather than being assigned by the
headquarters. Moreover, for a large client, an audit firm may propose a list of partners to
the client, in which case the client can choose its engagement partner. In this section, we
consider a decentralized assignment in which two partners bid for clients. As we will show, the
presence of partner identification disclosure affects partners’ bidding strategies and audit fees.
Like the headquarters, each partner faces a trade-off between audit liability in period one
versus career advancement opportunities in period two. However, a key difference between
the headquarters and the partners is that the headquarters wants to reduce the chance of
partners’ career advancement, whereas the partners want to increase the chance of career
advancement.25
Assignment and Fees. Let ft(i, j) denote the bidding price of partner i ∈ {1, 2} for
client j ∈ {s, c} in period t. The two partners share the audit fee revenue and audit liability
by the sharing rule (αi, βi)t, i ∈ 1, 2, αi, βi ∈ [0, 1], where αi and βi denote, respectively, an
incentive weight on audit fee revenue earned by partner i and an incentive weight on liability
incurred by partner i in period t. We maintain the feasibility assumption that each partner
will not bid below his break-even audit fee, in the sense that the expected payoff from his
bidding audit fee must be greater than or equal to the partner’s reservation wage. Without
loss of generality, we posit an equal sharing rule in period one (i.e., αi = βi = 1/2 for i = 1, 2
in period one) and use the notation (αi, βi) for period two.
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4.1 No Partner Identification
As in the centralized assignment case, career advancement is of no economic consequence
if there is no partner identification disclosure. Partners’ bidding consists of simultaneous
25Although we label this case as a decentralized regime within an audit firm, this case can also be inter-
preted as the market for audit service. With this interpretation, each partner represents his audit firm and
competes for a client. Our economic trade-off and the distortion therein are applicable to this situation as
well.
26The headquarters may have to change the sharing rule in period two depending on the disclosure rule
and the partners’ realized posterior reputations. However, regardless of sharing rules, the expected payoff of
each partner is his reservation wage.
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offers made by each partner to two clients. When partner i decides his bidding strategy,
he takes the other partner’s bidding price as given. Then, each client compares the bidding
prices, if any, and selects the best offer that generates a greater payoff. If the offered price
generates a payoff less than the client’s reservation utility, the client rejects the offer. If two
partners prefer the same client, then the partner who is preferred by the client is assigned
to the client, and the remaining partner is assigned to the remaining client.27
Period Two. Partner i’s bidding price must cover the total expected liability and his
reservation wage. Recall that γˆHQ denotes the headquarters’ posterior reputation. Since the
market cannot identify the partners’ identities, they value the partners by ω(γˆHQ). When
partner 1 determines the bidding price for the complex client, f2(1, c), he takes partner 2’s
price for the simple client, f2(2, s), as given, and vice versa for partner 2:
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α1f2(1, c) + (1− α2)f2(2, s)− L(1− p)
(
β1µ(γ
Xj
1 , c) + (1− β2)µ(γ
Xj′
2 , s)
) ≥ ω(γˆHQ), (4)
(1− α1)f2(1, c) + α2f2(2, s)− L(1− p)
(
(1− β1)µ(γXj1 , c) + β2µ(γ
Xj′
2 , s)
) ≥ ω(γˆHQ). (5)
The inequality (4) is for partner 1 who takes partner 2’s price as given, and the inequality (5)
is for partner 2 who takes partner 1’s price as given. Similar inequalities are constructed for
the alternative assignment in which partner 1 bids for the simple client and partner 2 bids
for the complex client while taking each other’s price as given.29 Because the reservation
wage for each partner is fixed at the beginning of period two, the right hand side of above
inequalities (4) and (5) is independent of the audit engagement in period two.
As in the headquarters’ assignment problem, partners’ bidding is solved by minimizing
expected cost (i.e., liability). Because we assume a competitive audit market, the equilibrium
audit fee is determined by the partners’ break-even conditions: each partner’s expected payoff
27Similarly, if two clients prefer the same partner, then the client who is preferred by that partner is
assigned to the partner, because that partner will bid first for the client that he prefers.
28As in the centralized assignment, the clients can conjecture the reputation of the partners based on their
bidding prices. However, due to the feasibility assumption, the clients will not receive audit fees below each
partner’s break-even price.
29This case includes a situation where both partners want to bid for the same client because the rejected
partner makes another offer for the remaining client. In this case, the bidding price for client j made by
partner i is determined by the bidding price for client j
′
made by partner i
′
, which happens if client j rejects
partner i
′
’s offer. See the proof of Proposition 4.
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in period two is his reservation wage. Then, client j chooses the partner that maximizes the
payoff in period two:
pV
′
+ (1− p)
(
I − µ(γXji , j)(I − L)
)
− f2(i, j). (6)
We show in Lemma 4 that the decentralized assignment obtains the first-best assignment
that minimizes the expected liability in period two. Intuitively, each partner’s reservation
wage is fixed at the time of bidding. Hence, both partners prefer the assignment rule that a
high (low) reputation partner audits the complex (simple) client to minimize the expected
liability.
Period One. As in the centralized regime, we will show in Lemma 4 that there is
no direct interaction between the two periods without partner identification. To see the
intuition, recall that without partner identification, there is no chance of career advancement.
Therefore, when partners bid for the clients in period one, the expected reservation wage in
period two remains the same as the current wage (E[ω(γˆHQ)] = ω(γHQ)). This suggests that
partners’ bidding strategies in period one are independent of period two.30 Thus, partner
1 audits a complex client and partner 2 audits a simple client. This confirms our result in
Lemma 2 that career advancement has no economic consequence when there is no partner
identification.
Lemma 4. (No Partner Identification) In each period, under the decentralized assignment,
the equilibrium partner-client engagement is that partner 1 audits a complex client and part-
ner 2 audits a simple client to minimize the expected liability.
4.2 Partner Identification and Career Advancement
Economic Trade-off. With partner identification disclosure, the two partners may
strictly prefer auditing for the complex client, in which case the complex client needs to
30Formally, for assignment rule a1(i), the audit fees in period one must satisfy:
1
2
(
f1(1, a1(1)) + f1(2, a1(2))− L(1− p)
(
µ(γ1, a1(1)) + µ(γ2, a1(2))
)) ≥ ω(γHQ).
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choose one of the partners. On one hand, if partner assignment is distorted, audit failure
is more likely to occur, thereby lowering the benefit of the audit (the second term of (6)).
On the other hand, engaging with the complex client increases the chance of the engaged
partner’s career advancement in period two. The expected future benefit due to the increase
in period two career advancement benefits a complex client in period one because the partners
are willing to lower the audit fee in period one (the third term of (6)).
Partners’ Bidding in Period Two. Because period two is the last period, partners’
bidding strategies are to minimize the audit liability. Thus, the audit assignment is not
distorted and the audit quality will be the same as in the non-disclosure case. But the audit
fees change because of the possibility of career advancement. To understand the intuition,
suppose partner 1 receives the outside offer λ(γSc1 ) after his successful audit outcome for the
complex client in period one and that partner 2’s audit outcome for the simple client was
Xs in period one. Then, when partner 1 bids for the complex client (taking partner 2’s
equilibrium bidding price f2(2, s) as given), his audit fee must satisfy:
α1f2(1, c) + (1− α2)f2(2, s)− L(1− p)
(
β1µ(γ
Sc
1 , c) + (1− β2)µ(γXs2 , s)
) ≥ λ(γSc1 ).
By comparison, the reservation wage (the right side of the inequality) is replaced by ω(γSc1 ) in
the absence of career advancement. Thus, if one of the partners receives career advancement,
then the audit fees are higher than in the non-disclosure case. The client who will be engaged
with that partner also has to pay the audit fee that generates the net payoff of λ(γSc1 ) to
that partner since it captures his reputation value. Moreover, because each partner’s payoff
will be his reservation utility, the pay disparity will be greater under partner identification
disclosure (same as in the centralized assignment).
Partners’ Bidding in Period One. In period one, each partner considers the potential
career advancement when they make a bid for clients. Specifically, when partner i bids for
a complex client in period one, the expected period two reservation wage is
qi(u)×
(
λ(γSci )− ω(γSci )
)
+ E[ω(γXci )] = T (u, i) + ω(γi),
27
where the equality uses the definition of the headquarters’ retention cost. In contrast, when
a partner bids for a simple client in period one, the expected period two reservation wage
is E[ω(γXsi )] = ω(γi). That is, by bidding for a complex client, partner i can enjoy the
increased outside option, T (u, i), which equals the headquarters’ retention cost under the
centralized assignment.
The presence of the potential career advancement in the second period intensifies the
competition for the audit engagement with the complex client in the first period. As both
partners strictly prefer audit engagement with the complex client, the partners may bid for
the complex client by offering an audit fee discount. While the complex client prefers partner
1 due to the expected high audit quality, the complex client may accept the discounted audit
fee from partner 2 if the discounted audit fee is sufficiently low that it outweighs the benefit
from the higher audit quality provided by partner 1.
We derive a condition with respect to L such that 1) the two partners lower audit fees
to match with the complex client, and 2) the complex client is willing to accept the distorted
offer in period one. Contrary to the centralized regime, the decentralized assignment does
not require the threshold for I, because the lost benefit from the high audit quality for the
complex client will be offset by the discount of audit fees made by partners.31 The following
proposition summarizes our result.
Proposition 4. (Partner Identification) In period one, partner 1 audits a complex client
and partner 2 audits a simple client. There exists a threshold LP ∈ R+ such that
• if L ≥ LP , then, there is no distortion in audit fees; or
• if L < LP , then partners always underbid due to their potential career advancement.
The total expected audit fees over two periods under the partner identification disclosure
(even with aggressive underbidding) are always greater than the total expected audit fees
under the non-disclosure. The thresholds LP is specified in the Appendix.
31The difference between the centralized and decentralized regimes is the competition between partners.
When the headquarters bids for each client, she assigns one partner to one client; thus, the client’s choice
is to either accept or reject the offer. In contrast, under the decentralized regime, the complex client may
receive two (discounted) offers from both partners, thus enjoying a benefit from the competition.
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When a partner has promising career advancement,32 then the decentralized assignment
faces a potential distortion in which partners aggressively underbid for clients. In particular,
when partner 2 is willing to lower the audit fee for the complex client, partner 1 has to reduce
his audit fee in order to match with partner 2’s bidding offer. This can be interpreted as
another source of low-balling (DeAngelo 1981). Clearly, the complex client enjoys the audit
fee discount because of the low-balling in the first period, although the client may face the
increase in audit fee in the subsequent period.
Due to partners’ underbidding, the headquarters suffers. Since the future career ad-
vancement benefits the partners (not the headquarters), the underbid audit price is always
less than the headquarters’ break-even price. Specifically, any discount made to the complex
client is the cost to the headquarters. Thus, this distorted equilibrium assignment is never
Pareto efficient.
Despite the low balling in period one, the total audit fees over two periods under the
partner identification disclosure are always greater than under the non-disclosure regime.
The intuition for this surprising result is as follows. Recall that the expected benefit from
career advancement is greater for partner 1 than partner 2, because partner 1 has a higher
ex ante reputation and lower likelihood of audit failure. The partners are willing to low-ball
audit fees in the first period up to their expected benefit from career advancement. On one
hand, partner 2 wants to low-ball the audit fee for the complex client, but the fee discount
must be smaller than the expected career advancement opportunity, because given his lower
ability, he bears incremental audit liability to audit the complex client. On the other hand,
partner 1 offers a smaller fee discount to the complex client than partner 2, because the client
can correctly anticipate that partner 1 will deliver a higher audit quality. This suggests the
following order: partner 1’s fee discount < partner 2’s fee discount < partner 2’s expected
benefit from career advancement < partner 1’s expected benefit from career advancement.
Taken together, the audit fee discount in the first period is always smaller than the expected
increase in audit fees due to career advancement in the subsequent period. Thus, the net
impact of the partner identification disclosure on the total audit fees over two periods is
32As we discussed in the centralized regime, partner identification is of no economic consequence on audit
fees when there is no career advancement, u = 0. A formal analysis is available upon request.
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always positive.
It is worth noting that our result in Proposition 4 remains the same even if the complex
client price-protects himself by asking for a greater discount from partner 1. We prove
this argument in the proof of Proposition 4. The intuition is as follows. Given that the
same complex client interacts with the two partners over two periods, the audit fee discount
offered by partners is simply a payoff transfer from the subsequent period. However, as we
show in Proposition 4, partner 1 does not need to transfer the entire expected value of career
advancement due to his higher audit quality than that of partner 2. Hence, the underbidding
may still occur.33
As in the centralized assignment, we conduct the comparative statics with respect to
u, λ, µ(h, c) and γ2. Intuitively, as career advancement is more likely (u increases), the
partners are more willing to bear the audit liability cost and to lower audit fees. At the same
time, the increased audit fee discount in turn makes the complex client willing to accept the
distorted offer. The same logic is applied to λ. As the career advancement is higher-powered,
the partners’ audit fee discount is greater and the complex client’s willingness to accept the
distorted offer is higher.
When the high type partner’s type II error increases, it becomes less costly to distort
for both partners and clients (as there exists a smaller difference between the high and low
type partners in detecting a financially bad condition), thereby leading to more aggressive
underbidding; this underbidding is accepted by the complex client if the lost benefit from
the audit service is not too high (not too high I). Lastly, as partner 2’s prior reputation
increases (i.e., more likely to succeed), the chance of career advancement is greater, thereby
leading to partner 2’s aggressive bidding.
Proposition 5. Suppose that L < LP so that partners underbid in equilibrium under partner
identification. The partners’ inefficient underbidding for the complex client is more likely
when
33 Theoretically, the complex client may strategically accept the offer from partner 2 (even without any
fee discount) in order to avoid a high audit fee in the subsequent period. This tension is the same as the
headquarters’ incentive for distortion. Even if this is theoretically possible, such collusion between the less
competent partner and the client seems neither realistic nor Pareto-improving (because, it makes the simple
client strictly worse off in the subsequent period). Thus, we abstract away from this unrealistic possibility.
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• the probability of career advancement increases (∂LP/∂u > 0); or
• the career advancement is more sensitive to a partner’s reputation (∂LP/∂λ > 0); or
• a high type partner’s type II error is greater (∂LP/∂µ(h, c) > 0) provided that I is not
too high, where the condition for I is presented in the Appendix; or
• partner 2’s reputation increases (∂LP/∂γ2 > 0).
5 Empirical Implications
Our theory provides several predictions. If the headquarters assigns clients to partners,
then we expect to see a decrease in audit quality but increase in audit fees in the first year
of the policy change because the headquarters may distort the partner-client match in order
to reduce her talent retention cost.34 This implies that learning partners’ types through
assignment is not fully exploited because the possible realizations of a partner’s posterior
reputation are affected by the distorted assignment. That is, information content in partner
identification is endogenous due to the headquarters’ cost and benefit from assignment. This
in turn implies that the argument that partner identification disclosure will increase audit
quality and enable learning about partners’ abilities can be limited.35
On the other hand, when partners bid for their own clients, audit fees are likely to
decrease for complex clients in the first year of the policy adoption because partners have
to low-ball due to competition amongst each other. Moreover, audit firms may suffer from
this inefficient competition (underbidding behaviors). But we expect to see a significant
increase in audit fees over the long term for complex clients because the reputation value of
the higher ability partner is higher than the discount he has to offer in the earlier period.
Audit fees remain the same for simple clients because there is no incremental competition
34The presence of career advancement (regardless of distorted assignment in period one) increases the
total expected audit fees in period two. Thus, together with an increase in period one audit fees, the total
expected audit fees over two periods are greater under the disclosure regime than under the non-disclosure
regime.
35We acknowledge that we do not directly model the cost borne by the headquarters from distorted
learning. Introducing such a cost would generate the net effect of the partner identification disclosure policy;
however, it would not qualitatively change our results.
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resulting from the disclosure policy. In addition, we do not expect an audit quality change
under the disclosure regime if partners bid clients directly, since partner-client matching is
not distorted.
Empirical research has shown mixed results regarding the effect of audit partner iden-
tification on audit quality and audit fees. Our theoretical predictions provide reasons that
audit fees and audit quality may not consistently increase. Moreover, our results suggest
that it is important to consider partner-client matching and legal regimes to better estimate
the impact of partner identification.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the economic consequences of audit partner identification
disclosure on partner-client engagements, audit fees, and audit quality. Although disclosing
partners’ names provides better information about audit partners’ talent to investors, it also
provides the same information to the labor market for audit talent, thus affects the partners’
career advancement opportunities. We show that partner-client engagements are subject to
distortion due to the headquarters’ concerns about partner retention and that audit fees are
subject to distortion due to the partners’ inefficient competition. Such inefficient behaviors
of audit firms and partners can also be viewed as signal jamming in the spirit of Holmstrom
(1999).
As an extension, one could search for an optimal audit engagement between the central-
ized and the decentralized regimes. In the model, we take the centralized and decentralized
regimes as exogenously given. Will an audit firm or social planner have a preference between
the two regimes when there is mandatory partner identification disclosure? Apparently, with-
out the identification disclosure, an audit firm (and social planner) is indifferent between the
two regimes, because neither partner assignment nor audit fee is distorted. Because partners’
underbidding results in audit fees lower than the headquarters’ break-even price, an audit
firm may prefer the centralized regime. However, given that the centralized regime faces
the lower audit quality and the decentralized regime faces audit fee discounts, it is not clear
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which regime is socially efficient, as neither regime is Pareto dominant. Understanding an
audit firm’s preferred assignment and/or analyzing the overall social welfare effect seem to
be a natural next step.
Another extension is to incorporate the reputation of audit firms. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that with only two partners, an audit firm’s reputation is the average
reputation of the two partners. When any of its partners fails (succeeds) to identify a client’s
type correctly in the first period, the audit firm’s reputation suffers (improves) as well. One
may argue that audit failure can give rise to more damage to an audit firm’s reputation
on top of audit liability concerns. In this case, we conjecture that an audit firm would
distort partner assignment to a lesser extent in the centralized regime under the mandatory
identification disclosure.
Our analysis can also be extended to a setting in which partner reputation is partially-
revealed. In the model, we assume that the labor market cannot establish the link between
an audit partner and an audit outcome without the identification disclosure. However,
it is possible that engagement partners could be identified in other ways. For example,
even without the identification disclosure, audit partners are periodically copied by name in
public correspondence between issuers and the Securities and Exchange Commission, through
which audit partner identification may be partially revealed to the labor market (Laurion,
Lawrence, and Ryans, 2016).36 It is intuitive that this potential communication channel
reduces the economic effect (information content) of the identification disclosure, because
the market has been partially informed about partners’ reputation, thereby mitigating the
distortion of partner assignment in the centralized regime and the lowballing in audit fees
in the decentralized regime.
While the repeated partner-client assignment model we propose invites many directions
for extension, we believe our findings provide better understanding of partner identification
disclosure, the newly adopted policy for multiple countries, thereby taking a step toward a
better assessment of auditing regulation.
36Also see Page 45 of PCAOB Release No. 2015-008 “Improving the transparency of audits: rules to
require disclosure of certain audit participants on a new PCAOB firm and related amendments to auditing
standards.”
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A Appendix. Proofs
A.1 Value of Audit
For notational convenience, we omit the time subscript t. Without loss of generality,
suppose partner i’s reservation wage is ω(γi). By receiving audit service from partner i,
client j’s expected payoff is:
pV
′
+ (1− p)((1− µ(γi, j))I + µ(γi, j)L)− f(i, j)
= pV
′
+ (1− p)((1− µ(γi, j))I + µ(γi, j)L)−
(
L(1− p)µ(γi, j) + ω(γi)
)
= pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γi, j))I − ω(γi). (7)
The first equality uses the break-even condition for audit fees. As long as the expression (7)
is greater than or equal to the client’s expected payoff without audit service, pV ′, the value
of an audit is positive. Formally, client j is strictly better off by receiving audit from partner
i if:
ω <
(1− p)(1− µ(γi, j))I
γi
.
When the partners’ career advancement is considered, we will have λ as the wage rate. Thus,
throughout the paper, we assume that max{ω, λ} = λ < mini=1,2 (1−p)(1−µ(γi,j))Iγi .
A.2 Bayesian Updating Formula
For each client j ∈ {s, c}, the possible audit outcomes are Xj ∈ {Sj, Fj, φ}, where
Sj = (B, b), Fj = (B, g) and φ = (G, g). Let γ
Xj denote the partner’s updated reputation
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upon the audit outcome Xj, i.e., γ
Xj ≡ Pr(h|γ,Xj). Then,
γSj =
γ × (1− µ(h, j))
γ × (1− µ(h, j)) + (1− γ)× (1− µ(l, j)) =
γ
γ + (1− γ)× 1−µ(l,j)
1−µ(h,j)
> γ,
γFj =
γ × µ(h, j)
γ × µ(h, j) + (1− γ)× µ(l, j) =
γ
γ + (1− γ)× µ(l,j)
µ(h,j)
< γ,
γφ =
γ × p
γ × p+ (1− γ)× p = γ.
A.3 Definition of an Equilibrium
Let P and J denote, respectively, the set of partners and the set of clients. Let a :
P → J denote a one-to-one matching function and f : P → J , an audit fee function. Let
pi∗ : P → R+ and v∗ : J → R+ denote, respectively, the payoffs of partners and of clients.
For the centralized regime, the headquarters assigns the partners to clients to minimize
the total costs given that such matching is individually rational (Roth and Sotomayor 1990,
Chapter 8). The headquarters’ equilibrium assignment is optimal if the two conditions are
met:
• Individual rationality of (pi∗, v∗) with respect to a and f : the matching and audit fee
provide to all parties at least their reservation utilities,
• Among all individually rational assignments, a minimizes the total costs the headquar-
ters bears.
Since we assume that partners stay as long as they receive their reservation wages, pi∗
consists of each partner’s reservation wage.
For the decentralized regime, partners and clients are matched in a stable way given
that such matching is individually rational (Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Chapter 2). An
equilibrium specifies a one-to-one matching function a : P → J , an audit fee function
f : P → J , and payoff pi∗ and v∗ such that
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• Individual rationality of (pi∗, v∗) with respect to a and f : the matching and audit fee
provide to all parties at least their reservation utilities,
• Stability of a and f with respect to (pi∗, v∗): there does not exist (i, j) ∈ P × J , pi′ ,
v
′
and f
′
such that a(i) 6= j and f ′ 6= f , but pi′ ≥ pi∗ and v′ ≥ v∗, with at least one
inequality strict.
In equilibrium, the audit fee is determined by break even conditions of headquarters
(under the centralized regime) or of partners (under the decentralized regime).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
For any audit outcomes, for the updated posterior γ
Xj
1 to be greater than the updated
posterior γ
Xj′
2 , it is sufficient to check the case in which γ1 obtains failure whereas γ2 obtains
success. Using the Bayesian updating formula we derived,
1
1 + 1−γ1
γ1
µ(l,j)
µ(h,j)
>
1
1 + 1−γ2
γ2
1−µ(l,j′)
1−µ(h,j′)
⇔ γ1
γ2
1− γ2
1− γ1 >
µ(l, j)
µ(h, j)
1− µ(h, j′)
1− µ(l, j′) for any j, j
′.
Let m = maxj,j′{ µ(l,j)µ(h,j) 1−µ(h,j
′)
1−µ(l,j′) }. Here m > 1 because audit failure is more likely under the
low type than high type (i.e., µ(l,j)
µ(h,j)
> 1), and audit success is more likely under the high
type than low type (i.e., 1−µ(h,j
′)
1−µ(l,j′) > 1).
We derive a condition with respect to γ1 − γ2. Let γ1 = γ2 + z. Then, the above
inequality can be written as:
γ2 + z
γ2
1− γ2
1− γ2 − z > m⇔ z >
γ2(1− γ2)(m− 1)
1− γ2 +mγ2 ≡M.
We need to check whether M is well-defined, i.e., M < 1− γ2, because γ1 = γ2 + z must be
less than one. It is straightforward to see that:
M < 1− γ2 ⇔ γ2(m− 1)
1− γ2 +mγ2 < 1⇔ mγ2 − γ2 < 1− γ2 +mγ2 ⇔ 0 < 1,
which is always true.
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Moreover, M is an increasing function of m:
dM
dm
=
γ2(1− γ2)
(1− γ2 +mγ2)2 > 0.
Thus, M is well-defined and γ1 > γ2 +M is feasible. Therefore, if γ1− γ2 ≥M , then for any
audit outcomes, the updated posterior of partner 1 is greater than that of partner 2.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof consists of two parts. We first show that the headquarters’ assignment decision
in period one does not affect the headquarters’ expected payoff in period two by showing
that 1) expected reservation wages in period two are independent of assignment in period
one, and 2) so is the expected audit quality in period two given that γ1 − γ2 ≥M . We then
find the optimal assignment in each period.
Part 1. Let Pr(Xj; γ) denote the probability of an audit outcome Xj when partner with
reputation γ audits client j. For instance, Pr(Xj = Fj; γ) = γµ(h, j)+(1−γ)µ(l, j) = µ(γ, j).
Regardless of assignment in period one, each partner’s expected posterior reputation is the
same as his prior reputation:
E[γXj ] = Pr(Xj = φ; γ)γ
Xj=φ + Pr(Xj = Fj; γ)γ
Xj=Fj + Pr(Xj = Sj; γ)γ
Xj=Sj
= pγ + (1− p)
(
µ(γ, j)
γ
γ + (1− γ) µ(l,j)
µ(h,j)
+ (1− µ(γ, j)) γ
γ + (1− γ) 1−µ(l,j)
1−µ(h,j)
)
= γ
(
p+
(1− p)µ(γ, j)
γ + (1− γ) µ(l,j)
µ(h,j)
+
(1− p)(1− µ(γ, j))
γ + (1− γ) 1−µ(l,j)
1−µ(h,j)
)
= γ.
Since ω(γ) = ω × γ, we have E[ω(γXji )] = ω(E[γXji ]) = ω(γi) for any j ∈ {c, s}. Thus, the
expected wages in period two are independent of assignment in period one.
Let ∆µ(j) ≡ µ(l, j)−µ(h, j). Suppose that partner γ audited client j in period one and
received outcome Xj, and audits client j
′
in period two. Given that µ(γXj , j
′
) = γXjµ(h, j
′
)+
(1− γXj)µ(l, j ′) = µ(l, j ′)− γXj∆µ(j ′), the expected audit quality (the probability of audit
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failure) in period two is:
E[µ(γXj , j
′
)] = E[µ(l, j
′
)− γXj∆µ(j ′)] = µ(l, j ′)− γ ×∆µ(j ′),
where the second equality uses E[γXj ] = γ. Since we assume that γ1 − γ2 ≥ M , we have
a2(1) = c, a2(2) = s regardless of audit outcomes in period one. Thus, the expected proba-
bility of audit failure in period two conditional on assignment in period one is:
E[µ(γ
Xa1(1)
1 , c) + µ(γ
Xa1(1)
2 , s)|a1(1) = s, a1(2) = c]
= µ(l, c)− E[γXs1 ]×∆µ(c) + µ(l, s)− E[γXc2 ]×∆µ(s)
= µ(l, c)− γ1 ×∆µ(c) + µ(l, s)− γ2 ×∆µ(s)
= µ(l, c)− E[γXc1 ]×∆µ(c) + µ(l, s)− E[γXs2 ]×∆µ(s)
= E[µ(γ
Xa1(1)
1 , c) + µ(γ
Xa1(2)
2 , s)|a1(1) = c, a1(2) = s],
where the second equality uses E[γXj ] = γ. Thus, the expected audit quality in period two
is independent of assignment in period one.
Part 2. Since we showed in Part 1 that the headquarters’ assignment problems over
two periods are independent, for notational convenience, we omit the time subscript. Recall
the headquarters’ payoff from choosing a(i): Π =
∑
i=1,2 f
HQ(i, a(i))− (L(1−p)µ(γi, a(i)) +
ω(γHQ)
)
.
There are two assignment options a(1) = c, a(2) = s or a(1) = s, a(2) = c. The
expected liabilities for both clients under each option are L(1− p)µ(γ1, c) +L(1− p)µ(γ2, s)
and L(1− p)µ(γ1, s) + L(1− p)µ(γ2, c). The difference
L(1− p)[µ(γ1, c) + µ(γ2, s)− µ(γ1, s)− µ(γ2, c)]
is less than zero due to supermodularity. That is, for γ1 > γ2, µ(γ2, s)−µ(γ1, s) < µ(γ2, c)−
µ(γ1, c). Therefore, liability minimizing assignment is a(1) = c, a(2) = s for γ1 > γ2.
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Let W denote the total wage costs in period two. Without loss of generality let partner
i audit the complex client in period one and partner i′ audit the simple client. Before period
one auditing takes place, the probability that partner i receives an outside offer in period
two is denoted as qi(u) = (1− p)× (1− µ(γi, c))× u. Observe that the expected period two
wage for partner i is then:
qi(u)λ(γ
Sc
i ) + (1− p)× (1− µ(γi, c))× (1− u)× ω(γSci )
+ (1− p)× µ(γi, c)× ω(γFci ) + p× ω(γi)
= qi(u)(λ(γ
Sc
i )− ω(γSci )) + E[ω(γXci )],
where the equality uses (1 − p) × (1 − µ(γi, c)) × (1 − u) = (1 − p) × (1 − µ(γi, c)) − qi(u).
Let D and ND respectively denote partner identification disclosure and non-disclosure. We
have:
E[W |D] = E[qi(u)× (λ− ω)× γSci + ω(γXci ) + ω(γXsi′ )]
> E[ω(γXci ) + ω(γ
Xs
i′ )] = E[W |ND].
With partner identification disclosure, the maximum pay disparity between partners is
λ(γSci ) − ω(γFsi′ ), whereas without disclosure, ω(γSci ) − ω(γFsi′ ), which is always less than
λ(γSci )− ω(γFsi′ ).
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that T (u, i) = qi(u)×
(
λ(γSci )− ω(γSci )
)
= u(1− p)(1− µ(γi, c))× (λ− ω)× γSci .
Then,
T (u, 1) = u(1− p)(1− µ(γ1, c))× (λ− ω)× γSc1
> u(1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c))× (λ− ω)× γSc2 = T (u, 2).
The inequality is due to µ(γ1, c) < µ(γ2, c) and γ
Sc
2 < γ
Sc
1 . Note that 1 − µ(γi, c) = 1 −
µ(l, c) + γi∆µ(c) and that T (u, i) can be simplified as:
T (u, i) = u(1− p)(1− µ(h, c))(λ− ω)γi.
It is straightforward to see that:
∂T (u, i)
∂u
= (1− p)(1− µ(h, c))(λ− ω)γi > 0,
∂T (u, i)
∂λ
= u(1− p)(1− µ(h, c))γi > 0,
∂T (u, i)
∂µ(h, c)
= −u(1− p)(λ− ω)γi < 0,
∂T (u, i)
∂γi
= u(1− p)(1− µ(h, c))(λ− ω) > 0.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof consists of three parts. We derive a condition in which 1) the distorted
assignment is feasible and 2) it takes place in equilibrium under the partner identification.
As specified in our definition of an equilibrium A3., for feasibility, both clients and the
partners receive at least their reservation utilities. Provided this feasibility, for the distorted
assignment to be an equilibrium, the headquarters’ total costs in period one and two must
be less under the distorted assignment than the undistorted assignment. We then show 3)
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how the aggregate audit quality and audit fees change under the distorted assignment.
Feasibility. Since the headquarters breaks even, the equilibrium audit fee is determined
by binding inequality (1). Plug the equilibrium audit fee into a client’s payoff (2). The
complex client’s expected payoff in period one under the distorted assignment is given by:
pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c))I − ω(γHQ), (8)
The expression (8) must be greater than or equal to the reservation utility, pV ′.
pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c))I − ω(γHQ) ≥ pV ′,
⇔ (1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c))I ≥ ω(γHQ),
⇔ I ≥ ω(γHQ)
(1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c)) ≡ I.
The reason ω(γHQ) is used even though the complex client conjectures that partner 2 will
be assigned is because of the feasibility assumption that the partner’s wage payment is
at least greater than or equal to his outside option which is based on the market’s belief
about the partner’s ability, γHQ. Thus, the audit quality is based on the engaged partner’s
true reputation γ2 whereas his reservation wage ω(γHQ) is based on the market’s belief.
Meanwhile, the distorted assignment also needs to be accepted by the simple client. While
the simple client conjectures that partner 1 will be assigned, however, by the same logic,
partner 1’s wage in period one is based on the market’s belief about the partner’s perceived
ability in period one (before disclosure). Thus, the simple client enjoys positive externality
from high audit quality at a cheaper price and the condition I ≥ ω(γHQ)
(1−p)(1−µ(γ1,s)) is satisfied as
long as I ≥ I. Lastly, the headquarters pays the partners their reservation wages to retain
them in each period. Therefore, as long as I ≥ I, the distorted assignment is feasible .
Optimality. The headquarters makes its assignment decision by comparing the total
expected costs in period one and two conditional on assignment a1(1) = c, a1(2) = s to the
total costs conditional on assignment a1(1) = s, a1(2) = c.
Provided that γ1 − γ2 ≥ M (thus, a2(1) = c, a2(2) = s), the headquarters’ expected
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period two cost when she chooses a1(1) = c, a1(2) = s is:
E[L(1− p)
(
µ(γXc1 , c) + µ(γ
Xs
2 , s)
)
+
(
ω(γXc1 ) + ω(γ
Xs
2 )
)
+ T (u, 1)].
Except T (u, 1), the remaining terms are the same as the headquarters’ period two costs
under the non-disclosure. Let E[CND2 ] denote the headquarters’ expected cost in period two
without disclosure. Thus, the above can be written as
E[CND2 ] + T (u, 1).
Since we show that E[µ(γXs1 , c) +µ(γ
Xc
2 , s)] = E[µ(γ
Xc
1 , c) +µ(γ
Xs
2 , s)] and that E[ω(γ
Xj
i )] =
ω(γi) (in Lemma 2), we can write the headquarters’ expected period two cost as E[C
ND
2 ] +
T (u, 2) under the distorted assignment, a1(1) = s, a1(2) = c .
Now, to determine whether the headquarters is better off by distorting assignment,
consider her total costs (over period one and two) under a1(1) = c, a1(2) = s:
L(1− p)(µ(γ1, c) + µ(γ2, s))+ 2ω(γHQ) + E[CND2 ] + T (u, 1). (9)
On the other hand, her total costs under the assignment a1(1) = s, a1(2) = c,
L(1− p)(µ(γ1, s) + µ(γ2, c))+ 2ω(γHQ) + E[CND2 ] + T (u, 2). (10)
Here, the total wage payments in period one is 2ω(γHQ) regardless of period one assignment
because the partners’ reservation wages in period one are agreed at the beginning of period
one (before the disclosure).
The headquarters strictly prefers the distorted assignment if the total costs (10) are less
than the total costs (9):
T (u, 1)− T (u, 2) > L(1− p)(γ1 − γ2)(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)), (11)
where ∆µ(j) = µ(l, j)−µ(h, j). Due to supermodularity, ∆µ(c)−∆µ(s) > 0. As we showed
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in Proposition 1, the left hand side of inequality (11) is strictly positive. Then, inequality
(11) can be written as:
L <
T (u, 1)− T (u, 2)
(1− p)(γ1 − γ2)
(
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s))
=
u(1− p)(1− µ(h, c))(λ− ω)(γ1 − γ2)
(1− p)(γ1 − γ2)
(
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s))
=
u(λ− ω)(1− µ(h, c))
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s) ≡ L
HQ.
Thus, when L < LHQ, the headquarters strictly prefers the distorted assignment.
Therefore, if L < LHQ and I ≥ I, then the assignment a1(1) = s, a1(2) = c is feasible
and minimizes the headquarters’ total costs over period one and two, thus constitute an
equilibrium. If either of conditions is not satisfied, then there is no distortion in equilibrium
audit engagement.
Audit quality and fees. First, the audit quality decreases for the complex client
by µ(γ2, c) − µ(γ1, c) = (γ1 − γ2)∆µ(c), whereas the audit quality increases for the simple
client by µ(γ2, s)− µ(γ1, s) = (γ1− γ2)∆µ(s). Since the audit fees are equal to the expected
liability plus the reservation wage payments (the headquarters’ break-even condition), upon
the distortion, the audit fee for the complex client increases by L(1−p)(γ1−γ2)∆µ(c) whereas,
for the simple client, it decreases by L(1 − p)(γ1 − γ2)∆µ(s). Since the wage payment for
each partner in period one is ω(γHQ) under both assignments, the impact on the audit fees
results from the changes in liability. Due to supermodularity, ∆µ(c) > ∆µ(s), the total
effect in period one lowers the audit quality by (γ1 − γ2)(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)) and increases the
audit fee by L(1− p)(γ1 − γ2)(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)).
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that ∆µ(c) = µ(l, c)− µ(h, c). It is immediate to see that
∂LHQ
∂u
=
(λ− ω)(1− µ(h, c))
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s) > 0,
∂LHQ
∂λ
=
u(1− µ(h, c))
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s) > 0,
∂LHQ
∂µ(h, c)
=
u(λ− ω)(1− µ(l, c) + ∆µ(s))
(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s))2 > 0,
∂LHQ
∂γi
= 0.
Since I =
ω(γHQ)
(1−p)(1−µ(γ2,c)) , we have
∂I
∂u
= ∂I
∂λ
= 0, and ∂I
∂µ(h,c)
=
γ2ω(γHQ)
(1−p)(1−µ(γ2,c))2 > 0. Moreover,
∂I
∂γ1
= ω
2(1−p)(1−µ(γ2,c)) > 0 and
∂I
∂γ2
= ω(1−µ(l,c)−γ1∆µ(c))
2(1−p)(1−µ(γ2,c))2 , which is greater than 0 if µ(l, c) +
γ1∆µ(c) < 1, or less than 0 if µ(l, c) + γ1∆µ(c) > 1.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 4
As in the centralized regime, any cost (which depends on assignment) is expected li-
ability. Thus, partners bid for clients to minimize the expected liability they bear. We
constructively find a stable equilibrium assignment based on a deferred acceptance algo-
rithm. Then, we show that the expected liability is minimized when partner 1 (partner 2)
is assigned to a complex (simple) client compared to the alternative assignment. To find
a2(1), a2(2) and f2(1, a2(1)), f2(2, a2(2)), observe that when each partner bids, he takes the
other partner’s bidding price as given and minimizes the expected liability that he bears
as in the headquarters’ case. Then, the offered audit fee, f2(1, a2(1)), f2(2, a2(2)), will be
determined from the zero-profit condition provided that the audit engagement and audit fee
guarantee each client’s reservation utility.
As mentioned in the main text, the sharing rule in period two may change upon the
change in partners’ reservation wages. There can be infinitely many feasible sharing rules
between partners, however, we will shortly see that the sharing rule does not change the
equilibrium audit engagement. Recall that (αi, βi)i=1,2 denote the revenue and liability shar-
ing rule in period two. While there are many unknown variables (including the exogenously
given sharing rule), there are only two possible arrangements: a2(1) = c, a2(2) = s or
a2(1) = s, a2(2) = c. We will shortly see that this simplifies the analysis.
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Let γ
Xj
1 and γ
Xj′
2 denote partner 1’s and partner 2’s updated reputation at the beginning
of period two and let γˆHQ =
γ
Xj
1 +γ
Xj′
2
2
. Each partner bids as follows:
α1f2(1, a2(1)) + (1− α2)f2(2, a2(2))− (1− p)L(β1µ(γXj1 , a2(1)) + (1− β2)µ(γ
Xj′
2 , a2(2)))
≥ ω(γˆHQ) for partner 1,
(1− α1)f2(1, a2(1)) + α2f2(2, a2(2))− (1− p)L((1− β1)µ(γXj1 , a2(1)) + β2µ(γ
Xj′
2 , a2(2)))
≥ ω(γˆHQ) for partner 2.
Rearrange the liability term,
α1f2(1, a2(1)) + (1− α2)f2(2, a2(2))
≥ (1− p)L(β1µ(γXj1 , a2(1)) + (1− β2)µ(γ
Xj′
2 , a2(2))) + ω(γˆHQ),
(1− α1)f2(1, a2(1)) + α2f2(2, a2(2))
≥ (1− p)L((1− β1)µ(γXj1 , a2(1)) + β2µ(γ
Xj′
2 , a2(2))) + ω(γˆHQ).
Add these two inequalities and use the fact that in equilibrium, the inequalities are satisfied
with equality, we have
f2(1, a2(1)) + f2(2, a2(2))
= (1− p)L(µ(γXj1 , a2(1)) + µ(γ
Xj′
2 , a2(2))) + 2ω(γˆHQ). (12)
Due to supermodularity of µ(γi, j), it is immediate to see that:
f2(1, c) + f2(2, s) < f2(1, s) + f2(2, c).
Therefore, the liability minimizing assignment, a2(1) = c, a2(2) = s, also minimizes audit
fees. For this to be an equilibrium assignment, the corresponding audit fee must guarantee
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at least the clients’ reservation utilities as specified in (6).
pV
′
+ (1− p)(I − µ(γXj1 , c)(I − L))− f2(1, c) ≥ pV
′
for client c,
pV
′
+ (1− p)(I − µ(γXj′2 , s)(I − L))− f2(2, s) ≥ pV
′
for client s.
Since there are two audit fee variables in one equation (12), there are infinitely many potential
audit fees. However, there always exist f2(1, c) and f2(2, s) that satisfy (12) and guarantee
the reservation utility for clients. To see this, add the above two inequalities and use (12) to
replace the audit fees:
(1− p)I(2− µ(γXj1 , c)− µ(γ
Xj′
2 , s)) > 2ω(γˆHQ),
⇔ (1− p)I(1− µ(γXj1 , c))− ω(γˆHQ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (1− p)I(1− µ(γXj′2 , s))− ω(γˆHQ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0,
where the last step uses our assumption on the value of an audit, A1.
Notice that, without partner identification, due to the liability sharing, as long as βi ∈
(0, 1), both partners 1 and 2 prefer the audit engagement in which partner 1 audits the
complex client and partner 2 audits the simple client. Based on this observation, now we
describe the partner-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is based on Gale and
Shapely’s deferred acceptance algorithm (Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Theorem 2.8). First,
each partner proposes to its highest preferred client: partner 1 makes an offer to the complex
client and partner 2 makes an offer to the simple client. Then, each client makes a tentative
match based on their preferred offer, and reject the other offer. Since it is better to receive
audit service than none, there is no such offer that is unacceptable: the complex client
accepts partner 1 and the simple client accepts partner 2. Since there is no more rejection
or offer, this tentative match is stable, thus an equilibrium.
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A.11 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds as follows. We derive a condition in which underbidding is feasible
and takes place in equilibrium. i.e., underbidding must provide at least reservation utilities
for both clients and partners (feasibility) and such underbidding is stable in the sense that
there is no more profitable deviation. We find a stable assignment equilibrium constructively
using a partner-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. We will show that our result
remains qualitatively the same even if the clients care about period two consequences upon
period one audit engagement. Lastly, we will discuss the impact of partner identification
disclosure on the total audit fees in period one and two.
Feasibility. For underbidding to be feasible, receiving audit from partner 2 must
generate a greater expected payoff (than partner 1 without underbidding) to the complex
client. As mentioned in Proposition 2, since the complex client can infer the identity of each
partner based on their bidding and the audit fee must be based on the partner’s reservation
wage (which is determined at the beginning of period one), the only relevant component is
the liability. That is, the discount that partner 2 can offer by reducing the audit fee must
compensate the lost benefit incurred to the complex client. Let fND1 (i, j) denote partner i’s
break-even price that he would bid if he worked for client j without partner identification
(which is also the same as the headquarters’ break-even price). Let d2 denote partner 2’s
maximum discount he is willing to offer (we will derive this shortly). The complex client
would accept the offer from partner 2 if the presence of d2 generates a greater payoff when
receiving audit from partner 2 than the payoff from partner 1 as follows:
pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c))I + (1− p)µ(γ2, c)L− (fND1 (2, c)− d2)
> pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γ1, c))I + (1− p)µ(γ1, c)L− fND1 (1, c)
⇔ d2 > (1− p)(γ1 − γ2)∆µ(c)(I − L) + (fND1 (2, c)− fND1 (1, c)), (13)
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where fND1 (i, c) is determined by (from expression (12)):
fND1 (1, c) + f
ND
1 (2, s) = (1− p)L(µ(γ1, c) + µ(γ2, s)) + 2ω(γHQ) for fND1 (1, c),
fND1 (1, s) + f
ND
1 (2, c) = (1− p)L(µ(γ1, s) + µ(γ2, c)) + 2ω(γHQ) for fND1 (2, c).
For each fND1 (i, c), we have two audit fee variables for one equation, thus, there are infinitely
many possible audit fee combinations. Without loss of generality, we assume that audit fee
is split fairly so that it is the expected liability plus the partner’s reservation wage pertaining
to that client. Thus,
fND1 (1, c) = (1− p)Lµ(γ1, c) + ω(γHQ),
fND1 (2, c) = (1− p)Lµ(γ2, c) + ω(γHQ).
Then, (fND1 (2, c)−fND1 (1, c)) = (1−p)L(γ1−γ2)∆µ(c) and the condition (13) can be written
as:
d2 > (1− p)(γ1 − γ2)∆µ(c)I. (14)
The right hand side captures the lost benefit from audit service for the complex client upon
accepting the distorted offer from partner 2. That is, the offered discount from partner 2
must be greater than the lost benefit from audit service for the complex client.
We now derive the threshold LP below which partner 2 is willing to underbid. Partner
2’s willingness to underbid is important because without partner 2’s underbidding, partner
1 does not have to worry about matching with the complex client. Recall that the sharing
rule in period one is 1/2. For partner 2 (who wants to minimize period one liability but at
the same time maximize the chance of career advancement) to have incentive to underbid,
it must be the case that the increased outside option in period two is greater than the
incremental expected liability in period one due to distortion. Formally,
−1
2
(1− p)L(µ(γ1, s) + µ(γ2, c)) + T (u, 2)
> −1
2
(1− p)L(µ(γ1, c) + µ(γ2, s)),
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here, as in the headquarters’ case, when partner 2 compares two assignment rules, the
equilibrium audit fees do not appear because they are determined by the partners’ break-
even conditions and partners bid in order to minimize the liability they bear. Rearrange this
and use that µ(γ2, j)− µ(γ1, j) = (γ1 − γ2)∆µ(j), we have
T (u, 2) >
L(1− p)
2
(γ1 − γ2)(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)).
Thus, partner 2’s maximum discount, d2, is:
d2 = T (u, 2)− L(1− p)
2
(γ1 − γ2)(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)).
That is, partner 2 is willing to bid by f1(2, c) = f
ND
1 (2, c) − d2. Rearrange inequality (14)
to derive a condition for L,
d2 > (1− p)(γ1 − γ2)∆µ(c)I
⇔ L < 2
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)
(u(λ− ω)(1− µ(h, c))γ2
γ1 − γ2 −∆µ(c)I
)
≡ LP . (15)
Thus, if L < LP , partner 2 is willing to underbid up to d2 and the complex client would be
willing to accept if partner 1 had not offered any discount.
Recall that T (u, 1) > T (u, 2). Thus, partner 1 is willing to offer a greater discount.
Given that partner 2 is willing to discount audit fee, say by d2 for the complex client,
partner 1 must offer the discount d1 such that the complex client is indifferent between the
two offers:
pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γ2, c))I + µ(γ2, c)L− (fND1 (2, c)− d2)
= pV
′
+ (1− p)(1− µ(γ1, c))I + µ(γ1, c)L− (fND1 (1, c)− d1)
⇔ d1 ≡ d2 − (1− p)(γ1 − γ2)∆µ(c)I.
Since L < LP , we have d1 ≥ 0. In principle, partner 1 may offer the discount greater than
d1, however, given that the partners want to maximize their payoffs, there is no incentive for
partner 1 to bid further below fND1 (1, c)−d1. Since T (u, 1) > T (u, 2) and T (u, 2) > d1, part-
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ner 1 enjoys a strictly positive benefit from the expected career advancement (even though
the discounted offered price is less than his break-even price without career advancement).
For given offered prices by both partners, the complex client prefers partner 1 to partner 2
for discount d1 +  for any  ≥ 0 made by partner 1. Since f1(1, c) = fND1 (1, c)− d1, where
fND1 (1, c) is the headquarters’ break-even price, the equilibrium audit fee for the complex
client is less than the headquarters’ break-even price. Lastly, auditing for the simple client
does not generate any benefit. Thus, the audit fee for the simple client is the same as that
under non-disclosure regime, which guarantees the reservation utility for the simple client,
thus accepted.
Stability. We now show that, with the audit fees found above and for L < LP , the
assignment in which partner 1 audits the complex client and partner 2 audits the simple
client is stable. First, notice that both partners prefer the complex client most: partner 1
prefers the complex client because it minimizes the total expected liabilities and expands
career advancement; partner 2 prefers the complex client although it increases the expected
liabilities he bears, the expected benefit of career advancement exceeds such liabilities (In-
equality (15)). Thus, initially, both partner 1 and partner 2 make an offer to the complex
client. Then, the complex client tentatively accepts partner 1 due to the underbid price and
rejects partner 2. Then, partner 2 makes an offer to the simple client, in which case the
simple client accepts. Since there is no more rejection or offer, this tentative assignment is
stable, thus an equilibrium.
Higher discount to price-protect. We show that this proof remains the same even
if the complex client price-protects himself by asking a greater discount from partner 1 due
to period two consequence. The maximum discount partner 1 can offer is T (u, 1). Partner 1
has to offer the discount that covers increased cost for the complex client in period two due
to partner 1’s career advancement minus any cost borne by the client due to the cost from
low audit quality (from partner 2):
d′1 = T (u, 1)− (1− p)(γ1 − γ2)∆µ(c)I.
Since two partners strictly prefer the complex client, it is sufficient to show that both partner
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1 and the complex client do not have any incentive to deviate. First, given the discount offer
d′1, the complex client is indifferent, thus taking partner 1’s offer. Second, by offering d
′
1,
partner 1 enjoys strictly positive benefit (by T (u, 1)− d′1) from auditing the complex client.
Offering discount is the same as transferring increased outside option in period two to period
one. However, due to superior audit quality of partner 1, he does not need to fully compensate
the complex client who cares about period two.
Total audit fees. Let AF =
∑
t=1,2
∑
i=1,2 ft(i, at(i)) denote the total audit fees
over two periods. We compare E[AF |D] (under the disclosure regime) to E[AF |ND] (under
the non-disclosure regime). The total audit fees consist of 1) expected liability, 2) partners’
reservation wages, and 3) fee discounts, if any. Since in both periods, the assignment is
at(1) = c, at(2) = s for t = 1, 2, the total expected liability is the same in both disclosure
and non-disclosure regimes. We showed that the partners’ reservation wages (in period one
and two) are greater under the disclosure than non-disclosure (Lemma 3). As for an audit fee
discount d1 (or d
′
1) in period one under the disclosure regime, partner 1 offers the discount
which is strictly less than the expected benefit of his career advancement. The total audit
fees under the non-disclosure regime contains neither the benefit of career advancement nor
the audit fee discount. Thus,
E[AF |D]− E[AF |ND] = T (u, 1)− d1 > 0.
Here, the inequality is always satisfied (even if d1 is replaced by d
′
1). To understand the
intuition, first note that partner 1’s discount is always less than partner 2’s, because the
former can deliver higher audit quality to the complex client than the latter. Second, partner
2 bears incremental liability when he bids for the complex client. This suggests that partner 2
cannot lower the audit fee up to T (u, 2), that is, d2 < T (u, 2). Lastly, recall from Proposition
1 that the expected talent retention cost is always greater for partner 1 than for partner 2:
T (u, 2) < T (u, 1). Taken together, we have:
d1 < d2 < T (u, 2) < T (u, 1).
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Therefore, the total audit fees over two periods is higher with the partner identification
disclosure than without disclosure.
Next, we illustrate the mechanisms in more detail. If partner 1 audits the complex
client, he can better detect bad projects than the partner 2. Hence, the client can enjoy
a benefit resulting from a higher likelihood of avoiding investing in a bad project if hiring
partner 1. Now suppose partner 2 offers a discount that can be greater than the expected
benefit difference from avoiding investing in a bad project. Then partner 1 only needs to offer
a discount to be the difference between partner 2’s discount and the reduction of expected
benefits so that the client is indifferent. This is because partner 1 can provide such a benefit
difference due to higher ability.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 5
It is immediate to see that
∂LP
∂u
=
2
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)
(λ− ω)(1− µ(h, c))γ2
γ1 − γ2 > 0,
∂LP
∂λ
=
2
∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)
u(1− µ(h, c))γ2
γ1 − γ2 > 0,
∂LP
∂µ(h, c)
=
2
(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s))2
(u(λ− ω)(1− µ(l, c) + ∆µ(s))γ2
γ1 − γ2 −∆µ(s)I
)
,
∂LP
∂γ2
=
2u(λ− ω)(1− µ(h, c))γ1
(γ1 − γ2)2(∆µ(c)−∆µ(s)) > 0.
Here, ∂L
P
∂µ(h,c)
> 0 if I < u(λ−ω)(1−µ(l,c)+∆µ(s))γ2
∆µ(s)(γ1−γ2) , otherwise,
∂LP
∂µ(h,c)
≤ 0.
References
Abbott, L., C. M. Boland, W. Buslepp, and S. McCarthy. 2018. What’s in a name? the
impact of U.S. audit partner identification on going concern audit report modifications.
52
Working Paper, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Louisiana State University.
Acemoglu, D., and J.-S. Pischke. 1998. Why do firms train? theory and evidence. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1): 79–119.
Aobdia, D., C.-J. Lin, and R. Petacchi. 2015. Capital market consequences of audit partner
quality. The Accounting Review 90 (6): 2143–2176.
Bagnoli, M., M. Penno, and S. Watts. 2001. Auditing in the presence of outside sources of
information. Journal of Accounting Research 39 (3): 435–447.
Basu, S., and S. Shekhar. 2019. What’s in a name? Reputation and monitoring in the audit
market. Working paper. Econ One Research, Inc., University of Cape Town.
Becker, G. S. 1973. A theory of marriage: Part i. Journal of Political Economy 81 (4):
813–846.
Burke, J. J., R. Hoitash, and U. Hoitash. 2018. Audit partner identification: Evidence from
U.S. form AP filings. Working paper. University of Colorado Denver, Bentley University,
Northeastern University.
Carcello, J. V., and C. Li. 2013. Costs and benefits of requiring an engagement partner
signature: recent experience in the united kingdom. The Accounting Review 88 (5): 1511–
1546.
Causholli, M., and W. R. Knechel. 2012. An examination of the credence attributes of an
audit. Accounting Horizons 26 (4): 631–656.
Causholli, M., W. R. Knechel, H. Lin, and D. E. M. Sappington. 2013. Competitive pro-
curement of auditing services with limited information. The European Accounting Review
22 (3): 573–605.
Chen, Q., X. Jiang, and Y. Zhang. 2019. The effects of audit quality disclosure on audit
effort and investment efficiency. The Accounting Review Forthcoming.
Costa, J. E. R. I. 1988. Managerial task assignment and promotions. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society 56 (2): 449–466.
53
Cunningham, L. M., C. Li, S. E. Stein, and N. S. Wright. 2019. What’s in a name? initial
evidence of U.S. audit partner identification using difference-in-differences analyses. The
Accounting Review Forthcoming.
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor independence, ‘low balling,’ and disclosure regulation. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 3 (2): 113–127.
Dye, R. A. 1995. Incorporation and the audit market. Journal of Accounting and Economics
19 (1): 75–114.
Gale, D., and S. Shapely, L.. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The
American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1): 9–15.
Gibbons, R., and L. F. Katz. 1991. Layoffs and lemons. Journal of Labor Economics 9 (4):
351–380.
Gipper, B., L. Hail, and C. Leuz. 2018. On the economics of audit part-
ner tenure and rotation: Evidence from PCAOB data. Working Paper. URL
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3289927.
Greenwald, B. C. 1986. Adverse selection in the labour market. The Review of Economic
Studies 53 (3): 325–347.
Gul, F. A., D. Wu, and Z. Yang. 2013. Do individual auditors affect audit quality? evidence
from archival data. The Accounting Review 88 (6): 1993–2023.
Holmstrom, B. 1999. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective. The Review
of Economic Studies 66 (1): 169–182.
Knechel, W. R., A. Vanstraelen, and M. Zerni. 2015. Does the identity of engagement part-
ners matter? an analysis of audit partner reporting decisions. Contemporary Accounting
Research 32 (4): 1443–1478.
Knechel, W. R., J. Mao, B. Qi, and Z. Zhuang. 2019. Is there a brain drain in auditing?
the determinants and consequences of auditors’ leaving public accounting. Working paper,
54
University of Florida, University of Texas at San Antonio, Xian Jiaotong University, the
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Laurion, H., A. Lawrence, and J. P. Ryans. 2016. US audit partner rotations. The Accounting
Review 92 (3): 209–237.
Lazear, E. P. 1986. Salaries and piece rates. Journal of business pages 405–431.
Lee, K. K., and C. Levine. 2016. Audit partner identification and audit quality. Working
paper. Rutgers Business School.
Liu, X., and D. A. Simunic. 2005. Profit sharing in an auditing oligopoly. The Accounting
Review 80 (2): 677–702.
Lu, T., and H. Sapra. 2009. Auditor conservatism and investment efficiency. The Accounting
Review 84: 1933–1958.
Magee, R. P., and M.-C. Tseng. 1990. Audit pricing and independence. The Accounting
Review 65 (2): 315–336.
Milgrom, P., and S. Oster. 1987. Job discrimination, market forces, and the invisibility
hypothesis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (3): 453–476.
PCAOB. 2015. Improving the transparency of audit PCAOB release no. 2015-008. Wash-
ington DC: PCAOB.
Roth, A., and M. Sotomayor. Two-sided matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling
and Analysis. Cambridge University Express 1990.
Simunic, D. A. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of
Accounting Research 18 (1): 161–190.
Waldman, M. 1984. Job assignments, signalling, and efficiency. The RAND Journal of
Economics 15 (2): 255–267.
55
